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Introduction
The economic and monetary union (EMU) is characterized by a framework for 
economic policy-making in Europe which is unique. While the single monetary policy 
is oriented towards a Union-wide objective, namely the maintenance o f  price stability, 
the other policy areas involving fiscal and wage policies largely remain the 
competence o f  national governments and other national actors.
This thesis investigates some o f  the mechanisms o f  propagation o f  asymmetric 
shocks in a monetary union and the effect that they may have on the conduction of 
policies and ultimately on macroeconomic variables. In the context o f  the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), and without any pretension to be exhaustive, the question is 
addressed o f  whether the current framework o f  policy coordination, based on a 
common monetary policy oriented to price stability, national autonomy o f  fiscal 
policies within common budgetary rules and wage policies determined at the national 
level, is appropriate in ensuring macroeconomic stabilization.
The focus on asymmetric shocks is due to the specific importance they have in a 
monetary union. In the case o f symmetric shocks, the situation is not veiy different 
from that o f  a country which has its own currency. On the other hand, the effects o f 
asymmetric shocks on policies and macroeconomic outcomes in a monetary union 
was (and probably is) not yet completely understood. It is partially because o f  this 
lack o f  understanding that the presence o f big asymmetric shocks was used by 
economists as a criterion to decide whether a country should join the EMU.
As o f  fiscal policy, there are some changes related to the introduction o f  the 
common monetary policy that may lead national policy-makers towards a more 
intensive use o f  fiscal policies after the beginning o f  the EMU. First, there are no 
longer national monetary and exchange rate policies to respond to country-specific 
shocks, and fiscal policies can be used as a substitute for those. Second, i f  policy­
makers fail to take a long-term view, countries might be more inclined to run deficits 
in a monetary union. This is due to the fact that it is primarily the country relaxing its 
budgetary constraints that enjoys the short-term benefits o f deficits, whereas the 
negative consequences for the level o f interest rates are more limited in a monetary 
union and affect all member countries (the so called “ common pool problem” ). Third, 
the disappearance o f exchange rate risks within a monetary union reduces the
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sanctioning role o f  financial markets, as reflected in bond yield spreads. The passage 
from national monetary policies to the EMU could then imply a change in behavior o f  
the fiscal authorities.
The fiscal rules laid down in the Treaty o f  Maastricht and the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) set a limit to government deficits with the objective o f 
safeguarding the credibility o f  monetary policy both in the long term, by preventing 
excessive public debt build-up, and in the short run by keeping deficits low, thus 
reducing the risk o f  an unbalanced ex post policy mix. This would make the monetary 
union viable by ensuring low inflation and economic stability and protecting the 
European Central Bank from potential pressure for debt bailouts coming from the 
national governments.
Ex post, and in accordance with the theoretical predictions, it appears that, 
despite the existence o f  these fiscal rules, a tendency to fiscal activism arose after the 
introduction o f  the Euro. There is a clear difference in the conduct o f  fiscal policies 
between the period before the decision was taken on which countries would initially 
participate in the single currency (1992-1997) and the period thereafter (1998-2003). 
In the first period government deficits were strongly reduced, as mandated by the 
Maastricht Treaty, and the previous trend o f  large and persistent budgetary 
imbalances and increasing public debt ratios was reversed. In the second period 
(1998-2003) fiscal policy only partially met the objectives o f  the Stability and Growth 
Pact: while many countries had reached sound budgetary positions by 2000, a number 
o f  countries undertook insufficient consolidation at the time o f robust economic 
growth and even relaxed their fiscal policies, with the result that fiscal imbalances 
remained or re-emerged. Debt ratios remained very high in a number o f  countries.
The first two papers deal with some o f the mechanisms specific to a MU that 
may justify fiscal rules. The final paper provides an empirical assessment o f  the fiscal 
rules o f  the stability and growth pact (SGP).
The first paper focuses on the specific problems that a Central bank has to deal 
with in a monetary union hit by economic shocks in order to fulfill the goal o f  price 
stability. The interaction o f  the governments and the central bank (CB) is addressed in 
a game theoretical framework. First, the conditions in which the national governments
are able to put pressure on the CB are made explicit. Then the mechanism o f 
transmission o f  national shocks through the common monetary policy is analyzed, 
highlighting not only the existence o f the common pool problem, but also the 
multiplication o f  national disturbances to the whole union through monetary 
externalities (a sort o f  “domino effect” ).
The model shows that, relative to the one country case, in a MU fiscal activism 
is always bigger and the capacity o f  the central bank to keep inflation close to targets 
is much smaller1. As for fiscal rules, the main question addressed is whether a greater 
fiscal coordination reduces or increases the capacity o f  the monetary authority to 
reduce the volatility o f inflation. Formal and informal, discretionary (“ positive” ) and 
rule-based (“ negative” ) coordination o f  national fiscal policies and their interactions 
are examined as possible solutions o f  the game.
The paper concludes that the main point is not how much fiscal coordination is 
there, but the form it takes. It turns out that a mix of informal political coordination 
and binding rules is the one that best preserves the independence o f  the CB. As o f 
negative (rule-based) coordination, it is shown that a simple change in the definition 
of “ excessive deficit” to focus on coutry-specific, cyclically adjusted targets can at the 
same time allow more stabilization o f  output after a shock and a better control o f 
inflation by the CB.
The second paper emphasizes the role o f  wages. It relates fiscal activism with 
entry in the MU, as the first paper, but in addition the role o f  labor markets as 
multipliers o f  fiscal biases is explored. This mechanism is also typical o f  a monetary 
union, in which monetary policy does not respond to national variables.
The paper finds a relevant role for structural differences in the national labour 
markets on fiscal activism and on monetary policy. Furthermore, the common 
monetary policy has potentially asymmetric effects, which depend on the size o f  the 
different countries in the union and the structure o f  the national wage setting process.
The model makes a stronger case in favor o f  fiscal rules and o f  limits to fiscal 
deficits within a MU. It shows that fiscal constraints which limit the size o f  national
1 An important generalization compared with most of the literature is that a common inflation 
rate is not imposed, therefore accounting for tire inflation differentials observed in the EMU.
deficits are effective in re-establishing monetary dominance. They also ensure an ex­
post policy mix o f  stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policies and moderate wage 
inflation. Another way o f  dealing with asymmetric shocks in the model would be, o f 
course, some convergence across countries in the structure o f  labour markets.
Finally, the paper addresses the related question o f  whether a reduction o f 
public deficits before the adoption o f  the euro, as suggested by the Maastricht criteria, 
is a necessary or useful step. It concludes that the process o f  deficit reduction should, 
indeed, be completed before entry.
The final paper is an empirical assessment o f  the effects o f  the SGP on the 
European fiscal policies after the beginning o f  phase 3 o f  the EMU. It also looks at 
the effect o f  the recently implemented revision o f  the SGP on the European economy.
A set o f  structural VARs, one for each euro area country, is estimated. The 
VARs are identified via long run restrictions that are relatively uncontroversial and 
compatible with most theoretical models o f  fiscal policy, including the theoretical 
ones o f  the thesis; they also take into account the effect o f  monetary policy in order to 
avoid misspecification. The estimated models are then used for assessing the possible 
effect o f  alternative sets o f  fiscal rules, with particular attention to the Stability and 
Growth Pact both in its old and its reformed version.
The investigation highlights a number o f facts. First, fiscal policy has had in the 
past a limited smoothing effect on the cycle. Second, the rules o f  the Stability and 
Growth Pact have had overall a limited effect in keeping fiscal discipline. The 
modified rules o f  the Pact are thus likely to give the governments only a limited extra 
leeway to reduce the variability o f  the cycle.
The papers contained in the thesis constitute a far-from-exhaustive analysis of 
the problems o f  fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union. However, they 
provide interesting insights. They analyze explicitly some o f  the problems that may 
arise in a monetary union, such as the “ domino effect” o f  fiscal policies that may lead 
to more interventionism, the temptation for policy-makers to use the fiscal lever after 
entry into the monetary union and the role o f monetary externalities and labor markets 
in magnifying such incentives. An empirical assessment o f  the importance o f  these 
factors is provided in the final paper. Furthermore, these phenomena are shown to be
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related to structural factors such as the rigidity o f  labor markets and the size o f  a 
country in the monetary union, thus providing some empirically testable implications. 
Finally, the effect o f  different forms o f  coordination o f fiscal policies, either positive 
coordination or negative (rule based) coordination is analyzed in conjunction with 
these structural characteristics. The empirical chapter, however, suggests that the 
importance o f  different fiscal rules may have been overestimated. A more detailed 
summary o f  the findings will be presented in the conclusions o f  the thesis.
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In te r a c tio n  o f  fisc a l p o lic ie s  o n  th e  E u i'o  area : h o w  m u c h
p re ssu re  o n  th e  E C B ?
Luca Onorante * 
European University Institute
A bstract
Since the Helsinki European Council of December 1990, a process of increased coor­
dination o f fiscal policies in the area o f the Euro seems to be on its way. In this paper 
I examine this process from the point of view' o f the independence o f the European 
central Bank (ECB).
The interaction of the governments and the ECB is addressed in a game theoretical 
framework. First, the conditions under which in which the national governments are 
able to put pressure on the ECB are made explicit. Then the main question is addressed: 
would a greater fiscal coordination reduce or increase the capacity of the monetary 
authority o f targeting long run inflation?
Formal and informal, discretional (positive) and rule-based (negative) coordination 
and their interactions are examined as possible solutions o f  the game. I conclude that 
the main point is not howr much fiscal coordination is there, but the form it takes. It 
turns out that a mix of informal political coordination and binding rules is the one that 
best preservers the independence o f  the ECB. For negat ive coordination, it is show n that 
a simple change in the definition o f “excessive deficit" can at the same time allow’ more 
stabilization o f output after a shock and a better control o f  inflation by the ECB.
JEL C lassification: C7; E0; E3; E6; Ho.
K eyw ord s: European Monetary Union, European Central Bank, game theory, 
fiscal policy, monetary policy, policy coordination.
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n1 Introduction
Since the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, a process of increased coordination 
of fiscal policies in the area of the Euro seems to be on its way. In this paper I examine this 
process from the point o f view o f the independence o f the European central Bank (ECB).
The interaction of the governments and the ECB is addressed in a game theoretical 
framework. First, the conditions under which in which the national governments are able 
to put pressure on the ECB are made explicit. Then the main question is addressed: would 
a greater fiscal coordination reduce or increase the capacity o f the monetary authority of 
targeting long run inflation?
Formal and informal, discretional (positive) and rule-based (negative) coordination and 
their interactions are examined as possible solutions o f the game. I conclude that the main 
point is not how much fiscal coordination there is, but the form it takes. It turns out that 
a mix o f informal fiscal coordination and binding rules is the one that best preserves the 
independence of the ECB.
In  the present paper I try to determine which kind of coordination would allow the 
ECB to pursue its statutory goal of price stability. I start from the definition o f “best envi­
ronment’* as the one in which the ECB does not need to intervene to counteract exogenous 
or policy induced shocks. In such an ideal world, the fiscal policy stabilizes national output 
and unemployment, while the central bank takes care o f the common price stability.
In a world hit by shocks, the governments tend to act in order to stabilize the domestic 
economy. In doing so. it is natural for them to take into account the foreseeable reaction of 
their central bank1. While this strategic interaction lias been described in the case of one 
country, the possible outcome o f the interplay o f multiple fiscal authorities with a common 
Central Bank is not completely understood yet. In the rest o f the paper I address this issue, 
and try to answer to the following questions: which is the degree of fiscal coordination that 
best relieves the ECB from short-run stabilization and allows it to concentrate on long 
run inflation targeting? And should this coordination be based on binding rules (negative 
coordination) or discretional common decisions (positive coordination), or both?
1 In many European countries governments did not limit themselves to taking into account the reaction 
o f their monetary authority to the fiscal policy, but went as far as directly influencing the monetary policy 
by forcing the central bank to monetize the national debt. Such an explicit pressure is nowadays explicitly 
ruled out by the statute of the ECB.
1.0.1 The short story of European fiscal coordination
The current policy framework of the EM U presents a strong and unique asymmetry 
between the management of fiscal and monetary policies. The single monetary policy is run 
by a unique decision-maker (the European Central Bank) with a clear “primary objective” 
(price stability); by contrast, the fiscal policies remain in the hand of the Member States, 
with no objective specified by the Treaty. The only instrument of positive coordination of 
fiscal policies is the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG), non binding recommenda­
tions prepared each year by the Commission and adopted by the ECOFIN Council. On the 
negative coordination side, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is backed by sanctions 
in the case of “excessive deficits” . The SGP allows the ECB to “play on the safe side” by 
putting a strong limit to the discretional power of the national governments to conduct an 
independent fiscal policy.
The prospective scenarios The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 adopted 
the conclusions of an ECOFIN Council Report pleading for a strenghtening of economic 
policy coordination during Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Broadly 
speaking, increased coordination should include 1) a greater sharing of information among 
the member states, 2) a greater positive coordination and 3) a progressive reduction of the 
importance of negative (rule-based) coordination.
The principle of informing the other members of the euro area and the Commission 
before adopting an economic policy measure should form part o f a set o f “rules o f conduct” 
elaborated by the Commission in consultation witli the ECB. Furthermore, regular meet­
ings would be held between the ECB President, the President of the Eurogroup and the 
representative o f the Commission in the Council o f Governors o f the ECB.
While a literal interpretation of the Treaties impedes the formation of a formal govern­
ing body exclusively dedicated to fiscal coordination among the Euro countries, it would 
be certainly possible to increase the powers of the Eurogroup within the Economic and 
Financial Committee, by transforming it into a permanent working party and increasing 
the frequency o f its meetings. Short of a Treaty change, the formal power of the Eurogroup 
could also be strenghtened to the extent allowed by the “closer cooperation” clauses".
One should notice, however, that reinforced cooperation would not, even in the opinion 
of the Commission, determine the end of negative coordination (e.g. the SGP), but only a 
diminution of its importance.
2The reinforced co-operation procedures are based on Articles 43, 44 and 45 o f the Treaty o f the Union 
and Article 11 o f the EC Treaty.
3
n w j u u n u u a  * wuj m vn*\ i  !t ■„■h i  mini tu  it
«M i««*1:itifM»i>i«1n ii» i« r----- urm — ÏA
The terms of the debate Like any other Central bank, the ECB faces the conflicting 
objectives o f long-run price stability and short-run stabilization o f the economy in the 
presence o f shocks. Unlike any other Central Bank, the ECB does not face a single fiscal 
authority, but 12 different ones. In sucli unprecedented framework the consequences in 
terms o f pressure on the ECB are difficult to assess, and there is no unanimity of opinions. 
It is then not surprising that the Helsinki Council has revived the existing debate about 
coordination of fiscal policies, and that no agreement exist.
The first supporter o f strong fiscal coordination is the European Commission. The 
advantage of coordination would be that active fiscal policy is recovered for stabilization. 
Also, it is perceived by some that there is a need for fiscal coordination to ensure credibility 
of long-term commitments to macroeconomic stability.
On the other hand, a consistent part of the economic profession tends to be skeptical 
about the need for such a move. Many economists think that coordinated fiscal policies 
would place a greater burden on the monetary authority. A more intense coordination 
could lead to ‘Keynesian style’ fine-tuning of fiscal policies across the member states, and 
tliis would force the ECB to intervene in the policy mix and to pay too much attention to 
cyclical stabilization, neglecting the objective o f long run price stabilization.
The reported declarations by members of the Board o f  Directors o f the European Central 
Bank (ECB) seem to proceed along both lines o f reasoning: on the one hand, a stronger 
coordination between euro countries could be a potential threat to the independence of the 
ECB; on the other, it could reduce the level of political uncertainty resulting from a situation 
where economic policies are pursued independently by a large number of institutions. On 
this point even the ECB does not seem to dislike the idea of a “credible interlocutor'.
It it the opinion of this paper that this question can be addressed only by analyzing 
the strategic interaction o f the various policymakers. The paper is structured as follows: 
section 2 describes the model and clarifies the hypotheses that underline the idea of “fiscal 
policies putting pressure on the ECB’’ ; it finally provides a closed form solution for the 
model. Section 3 examines the consequences of different levels of positive and negative 
coordination and their interactions. The results are also illustrated via a simulation of 
a monetary union of 12 countries whose weights are equal to those into the EMU. The 
conclusions follow. The mathematical appendix provides a more complete characterization 
o f the results o f  the paper.
Some literature The issue of coordination in a monetary union is explicitly addressed 
in Dixit and Lambertini (2000), Bosea and Orts (1991), Van Aarle and Iluart (1997), 
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995) and in a game theory framework by Diaz-Roldan (2000),
1
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aGatti and Vail Wijnbergen (2002) examine the conditions for fiscal restraint to emerge as 
Nash equilibrium in the game between fiscal authorities in a monetary union. Bayoumi and 
Eichengrcen (1993) and the literature on the Optimum Currency Areas in their bibliography 
are a good starting point for the analysis of the shocks that may hit a monetary union.
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995) study the Nash equilibrium between fiscal and monetary 
authorities in a monetary union, focusing on common and idiosyncratic supply shocks. The 
focus on supply disturbances only allows them to claim that monetary unification enhances 
welfare only if the central bank is substantially less conservative than society, and analyze 
the role of international fiscal transfers. In a different paper Beetsma and Bovenberg 
(1995b) also study the case of fiscal dominance and argue that monetary union disciplines 
fiscal policies.
A paper extremely close to the present one but with different conclusions is the one by 
Dixit and Lambertini (2003). The authors analyze the interaction of a central bank and 
several fiscal authorities in a monetary union using a model which is very close to the one 
of this paper. They analyze the scenarios of monetary dominance (the central bank “moves 
first” or in other words it is able to commit), Nash equilibrium (both fiscal and monetary 
authorities play Nash), and complete coordination of fiscal and monetary policies. As in 
this paper, the essential hypothesis underlying their results is the agreement between the 
central bank and the fiscal authorities on the desirable levels of output and inflation. Their 
conclusion are however quite different: the optimal outcome is always attained, even in 
absence of any fiscal constraints. This result is driven by the absence of any bias of the 
fiscal authorities.
Some differences in the setup of the model make this paper a complement to Dixit 
and Lambertini (2003) in several ways. First, I also focuse on stabilization of idiosyncratic 
shocks when the desirable output and inflation levels are common but assume that the 
national governments put a greater weight on smoothing unemployment. Second, the 
players in my model cannot directly observe the shocks, but only their effects on macro 
variables. This feature is intentional and I believe it leads to more direct policy implications: 
after all, the shocks do not come with a label. Third, and most important, I analyze the case 
of fiscal dominance, when the fiscal authorities can form expectations (backward induct) 
on the reaction of the central bank. I explain in the rest of the paper why this case is 
particularly relevant in the EMU. Finally, I emphasize the role of rule-based coordination 
of fiscal policies ( “negative coordination” ) and the interaction between positive and negative 
coordination, which is a distinctive characteristic o f the European framework.
The legal framework in which coordination must arise in the EMU is spelled out in the 
Treaty of Maastricht, discussed in Bui ter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993), Von Hagen and
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Eichengreen (1996), and of course in European Commission (1991). The conclusions o f  
this paper about the rigidity o f the SGP are similar to those in Eichengreen (1996).
2 The model
In a simple monetary union hit by exogenous shocks, the single central bank and N  national 
fiscal authorities interact to achieve low inflation and full employment. The interaction 
between the agents is modeled with a game theory model solvable by backward induction, 
in which the national governments are able to put pressure on the ECB by running their 
fiscal policies after an economic shock. The focus is on  stabilization after a shock, not on  
reputational issues of the players, therefore the game is static.
The preferences of national governments difTer from those of the central bank because o f  
the greater weight put on smoothing unemployment3. The governments in all participating 
countries have identical preferences. The model is one o f short horizon, therefore the effect 
o f fiscal and monetary policy on inflation and unemployment is described by two simple 
demand equations with fixed expectations of the public.
To keep notation simple, only two governments are explicitly represented. Govern­
ment j  can be seen as the weighted average of all other participating countries as seen l>y 
government i. This simplification does not alter the symmetric equilibrium of the model.
In the first section the game is described and solved for the general case. The equilibrium 
conditions are then used in the second part to analyze some different scenarios.
T h e first-b est m onetary p o licy  The ECB has two, conflicting objectives: long-run 
inflation targeting (primary objective) and short-run stabilization o f the Euro area. The 
more the ECB can neglect stabilization, the better it can concentrate on the other goal. For 
this reason it is enough to model explicitly the short-run preferences for stabilization. These 
preferences should be interpreted as the trade-off between inflation and unemployment that 
the ECB considers consistent with long-run price stability. The optimal “working environ­
ment” for the ECB is then the one in which it does not have to intervene to correct what 
are, in terms of its preferences, “errors of the national governments” . More specifically:
• it does not need to intervene to offset the inflationary effects o f an excessive expen­
diture of the governments, where ‘‘excessive expenditure” is the expenditure that 
implies more inflation than the ECB would like given the exogenous shock.
3Given the short term characteristics of the model a greater weight on unemployment can also be 
interpreted as a greater speed o f desired adjustment.
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• it does not need to intervene because of the lack of action of the national governments. 
This may seem unlikely in the model, because the preferences of the national fiscal 
authorities are relatively more concerned about unemployment, but this eventuality 
may arise in presence of inflexible constraints to fiscal policy such as the ones imple­
mented in the SGP. It will be shown that under some circumstances these constraints 
can prevent the member states from coping with asymmetric shocks4 and put the 
burden o f the intervention on the ECB.
The meaning of “pressure on the ECB” The generic worry that the governments 
can influence the ECB ‘‘hides” many other assumption, that is important to make explicit 
in order to check their likelihood. I shall briefly outline these hypotheses here.
1. Backward induction: the governments must be able to form expectations about the 
reaction of the ECB and take them into account when formulating fiscal policy. In 
the jargon of game theory, the governments “mow first” .
2. The ECB can have preferences that are quite conservative, but they must also to 
some extent include unemployment. When the ECB is committed to the exclusive 
targeting of prices5 there is no scope for putting pressure on it because there is no 
trade off between prices and unemployment in its best response. The two first years 
o f EMU have clearly shown that employment is a relevant variable in the ECB policy 
decisions^'.
3. The national fiscal authorities are relatively more concerned about increases in unem­
ployment than the ECB. In absence of this “inflation bias” the problem of pressure 
on the ECB does not exist. It has been correctly stated that the case for fiscal coordi­
nation (and more in general for macroeconomic coordination) is weak when the ECB 
and the fiscal authorities “keep the house in order” acting on their own. At a closer 
look, the absence of inflation bias is not realistic. The expression “keep their houses in 
order” does not only imply that the fiscal authorities do not deviate from “prudent”
4 A relevant problem is when the shocks come from outside or inside the monetary union. It is assumed 
here that there is consensus among the players on the relevant variables to watch, and the preferences of 
the players are expressed in terms o f these variables. This is not an essential feature o f the model and this 
aspect is therefore assumed away, focusing the attention only on the interaction of the players.
'"Other solutions may exist. For instance, the Reserve Hank of New Zealand excludes from the targeted 
inflation the effect of government sales taxes. This can be seen as an attempt to limit the influence of the 
government.
^Employment could be included as a predictor of future inflation. In this case it would appear as if the 
ECB was concerned bv employment.
behavior because o f short run political incentives. It also amounts to assuming that 
the national governments show the same little concern about unemployment than a 
conservative central bank. This assumption does not seem to be observed in practice 
in the EU countries7. In the rest of the paper, the governments have an inflation bias.
4. Monetary policy is assumed to be relatively more efficient on prices than fiscal poli­
cies8. This simply means that the institution relatively more concerned about prices 
(the ECB) has been assigned the instrument that best controls inflation. A situation 
o f misallocation o f instruments would lead to the absence of equilibrium.
Other hypotheses o f the model are there simply to improve clarity and tractability.
The game aims at describing the interaction among public agents in responding to  
shocks. Each economy is then described by the same two simple equations of prices and 
unemployment. The interesting time horizon being the very short period, the expectations 
of the public are kept fixed. Finally, I want to concentrate on the effects o f monetary 
policy and monetary externalities, therefore I neglect the direct fiscal externalities and 
assume that the different countries are linked only by the common monetary policy: in 
other words, each national fiscal policy has direct effects in the domestic market only, anti 
indirect effects abroad through monetary policy. The minimization o f these indirect effects 
is at the center of the attention o f the present work.
T he sequ en ce  o f  m oves At the beginning of the game the market is in equilibrium, 
where equilibrium is defined as the situation where all agents (ECB  and Gs) are playing 
their best responses, the common target values for prices and unemployment are met and 
there is no shock. The moves are as follows: first, the national market are hit by independent 
shocks to prices and/or to employment; second, the national governments use the fiscal 
lever, and finally the central bank sets the monetary policy. The structure o f preferences 
of the agents is common knowledge, therefore the game allows for backward induction, i.e. 
the national governments take into account the foreseeable reaction of the central bank 
while setting their optimal policies.
‘ One should notice that a bigger concern for unemployment o f  the fiscal authorities does not need to 
arise from corruption or political cycles; while the ECB has a mandate oriented towards price stability, 
national governments are elected and their preferences should reflect those of the population.
8 In reality it is enough that the governments believe this when they move, but this would complicate the 
description o f  the game. While hypothesis 4 is different from the more commonly used Phillips curve, one 
can easily show that the latter would not give any incentive to the fiscal authorities to put pressure on the 
ECB. While this case is perfectly possible, most economists seem to believe that this pressure is a real risk.
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The order o f the m oves
Nature
e.t|
Gov
G1
N'Ns . -
'•\>v
Nature
0,0
Gov
0
Outcome
£P1,U1)
ECB f
J L \
Outcome
JP2.U2)
The order o f the players has been chosen to reflect both the capacity of influencing 
each other that is observed in real world and (as argued in the previous section) the only 
interesting case. In the first two years o f EMU, the policy o f the ECB has ben'll attentive 
to both inflation and unemployment levels, while the influence of the ECB on member 
states was limited to speeches, with the SGP as the only binding institution. If the ECB 
is not uniquely committed to price stability it is reasonable to assume that, as long as 
the governments have some freedom in the use o f fiscal policy, they can take into account 
a possible reaction of the ECB9. The order of play then reflects the relations of power 
among agents. A second interpretation could be that the ECB is “faster to react” , in the 
sense that it can change policy much more frequently than the national governments; this 
greater flexibility allows the ECB to follow any change in fiscal policies with an appropriate 
response. Under this interpretation, the order of players reflects a sequence in time.
2.1 The national markets
All national markets are identical in structure, but may have different inflation and un­
employment levels and different sizes. Each of them is affected by public policies in the 
following stylized way10:
pmM  + PgG +  £ (1)
- u mM — ugG +  i] (2)
where P. ?/, M, G indicate the deviations of prices, unemployment, money supply, fiscal
expenditure from target values, and e and 7/ are I.I.D. shocks to prices and to unemployment.
uThe SGP is a (very imprecise) way to take away such freedom from the governments.
I0It is important to notice that no single inflation level across the union is imposed.
9
The choice of assigning the shocks directly to the macro variables is unusual, as most 
of the literature prefers to have well-identified supply and demand shocks (e.g. Buti, 
2003, Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995) or shocks the parameters o f the model (Dixit and 
Lambertini, 2003). However, this formulation is intentional. Shocks do not come with a 
label, and their nature (supply, demand or parameter shock) has not been recognized at 
the time the agents play their strategies. Therefore, I found the idea of shocks to quantities 
which are observable to the players more interesting to develop.
The target values are common to the ECB an the national governments, but the former 
is less inclined to short-run output stabilization (hypothesis 3). All other letters are positive 
parameters.
Hypothesis 4 implies:
Pm Pt)
Um Ug
This condition simply states that monetary policy has a comparative advantage in 
controlling prices, and fiscal and monetary instruments have correctly been allocated.
2 .2  T h e  E C B
In models solvable by backward induction it is often convenient to start from the? player 
who moves last, in this case the central bank {ECB). The reason is that the strategy of the 
ECB is taken into account by the governments (G), wliile the play o f G is already known 
to the ECB when it moves.
The ECB runs the monetary policy for the whole union. The monetary policy is common 
and has symmetrical effects in all countries (given that they have identical structures). 
The preferences of the ECB are defined over union aggregates:
¿£CB(A/,G,£,7i) =  [P(A/,G,£)]2 + l3[U(M,G,n)]* (3)
where the variables without a subscript are the weighted average of the N  participating 
countries:
A/ =  £ f c i  MAI,
G =  E f e 1AiGi
* =  E m  * si 
V =  E m  A « ,  
w ith  E i l i  A.- =  1
The parameter 3 expresses the relative aversion of the ECB to inflation and unemploy­
ment.
10
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Preferences and Best Response o f CB
ECB
Tlio Best response of the ECB can be expressed as follows (see appendix):
N N N
M  (G,s, ?/) =  -¡ig ( J ^ A iG i ] — pe I )+/«/,( ^  Aji)i
j —l *=i
Or in a condensed representation:
M(G, e, 7)) =  - f i gG -  ftes +  T)
with fig =  -  [ p r ^ n ]  (-0UmUg -  pgpm)
Pc ■ 
fh> — +
Pfn+fa'm {~Pm)
fiu.m all positive.
The best strategy of the ECB is to deflate in response to an increase of expenditure by 
the governments (G) and to an exogenous increase of prices e, and to support employment 
when a negative shock r/ hits it.
The term in squared brackets is the reciprocal of the responsiveness of the target vari­
ables to a policy change and determines the size of the intervention. H ie ECB intervenes 
according to the slope of its Phillips curve (um/p m) and to the preferences ¡3. Observe 
that when only one or some countries of weight A/ are hit by a shock or adopt a policy 
change, the ECB will move proportionally from the perceived situation to its BR line. This 
implies that each governments faces a backward-induction “budget constraint” that does 
not coincide with the BR of ECB unless A; =  1. As an example, the locus of equilibria 
chosen by a backward inducting government is pictured below for A =  {0 ,1 /2 ,1 }.
11
Size and possible equilibria
2.3 The governments
In this section the best response function of the national governments is calculated in the 
most general framework. This will lead to some cumbersome notation, but it has the 
advantage o f encompassing all the other situations as special cases.
In the general situation (symmetric information) each government is not constrained in 
the choice of its fiscal stance and is aware o f the structure of the model and of the moves 
of nature (the shocks in all participating countries). Thus, each government is able to form 
expectations about the moves of its peers and (by backward induction) about the move o f  
the E C B 11, and acts accordingly.
The loss function o f each government i is
LaiiM i'GnsuVi) =  [ /M M .« . . - '; ) ]2 + (4)
and (hypothesis 3) the government cares about unemployment more than the ECB, there­
fore a >  f3.
11 The move o f ECB is the only variable of interest for the government because it affects the pavofT o f its 
strategy, while the fiscal policies o f the other countries do not have direct domestic effects but only indirect 
externalities coming from the reaction o f the ECB.
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Solving the FOC for G* (in appendix), one obtains the BR function of government i\
Gi (VhVj^i,
=  n *
Gj) —
“I" \{~^iPmPh) ( i^PmPg "h Pg) Oi { i^^hnPg W#) (1 Pi
T \{~^jPmPh) ( \Pmflg "I" P )^ ** {^ i'U'TnPg ug) ( AjUn,//j()] Pj
* ~~ [(1 — Mpmpe) (—^ iPmPg +  Pg) ~  O: (MUmftg — Ug) ( /^W-rn/¿e)] Si
— [(“ AjPntPe) ( i^PmPg Pg) & (A#U-mflg Ug) ( AjUn,/te)] £j
, +  [(PmMffAj) (-A fp m/£fl +  Pg) +  a  (AillmPg -  Ug) (-«iii/iffAj-)] Gj J
with
n =
(AfUmflg -  U g )2 a +  ( - A ip m ftg  +  pg)2
Fortunately this will be the most complicated expression in the paper. In order to grasp 
the intuition one has to take into account that the reaction of the ECB is automatically 
taken into account in the expression above, while those o f the other players are not (and 
they explicitly appear as arguments). This difference in treatment is due to the fact that 
the governments move simultaneously.
One extreme case (a =  0) is ruled out by hypotheses 2 and 3, but it is useful to consider 
it for the purpose of exposition. If G/ cares only about inflation (that is. if it is even 
more conservative than the ECB) a fiscal restriction will follow a shock to domestic or 
foreign unemployment because the comparatively “weak” ECB is going to allow some more 
inflation. The same is true after a domestic price shock only partially offset by the ECB.
13
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A fiscal expansion follows a foreign price shock simply because the ECB restriction is not 
welcome.
A government uniquely concerned about the internal level of employment (a  —► oo) 
always increases spending after a shock to unemployment. This reaction is somehow 
smoothed because the government knows that the ECB will take part o f the burden o f  
the intervention (1 — AiUmfih). If the shock arises in another country, the expected mon­
etary expansion of the ECB ( —Ajumfxh)  leads to fiscal consolidation. The same is true 
(with different signs, because the expected reaction o f the ECB goes in the other direction) 
for a shock to prices; the ECB will restrict the quantity of money, and this calls for fiscal 
expansion.
This coefficient yg is the indirect externality reaction to the fiscal expansion of other 
members. In appendix it is shown that hypothesis 4 implies that this parameter can take 
values between 0 and 1 (not included)12. This conditions ensures the existence of the 
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium13.
Finally, a shorter notation is introduced for the complex expenditure function of the 
generic government i: this function represents the BR o f a government free to move, aware 
of the fact that the ECB will move next and informed about the shocks in all participating 
countries.
Gi =  (7 e?i +  7 hVi) +  ( 7  i.£j +  y fhVj) +  7 gGj (5)
With 7 e <  0, 7 ft > 0, 7 /  > 0 , 7  ^ < 0  and 0 <  7 Ç <  1 under the hypotheses o f the model. 
The sign o f  the coefficients is derived analytically in appendix.
3 Five possible scenarios
The proposals for coordination are of two kinds: positive coordination and negative coor­
dination. Positive coordination consists of regular meetings in which the policy responses 
are coordinated on a case-by-case basis, negative coordination consists of rules laid down 
at the beginning and then followed tliroughout. By applying restrictions to the general 
model solved in section 2 , we can analyze the following scenarios, ranked from minimal to 
maximal positive coordination and contrasted with negative coordination:
,2In the game the coefficient "yg represents the (negative) reaction o f Gi to the (negative) reaction o f  
E C U  to the variation in G j.  I ’ll is is sometimes referred to as ’’domino effect" o f fiscal policies,
13Technically, one has a Nash Equilibium of a reduced form game between governments, with the reac­
tion function of the ECB factored in their objective function. This corresponds to the Subgame Perfect 
Equilibrium o f  the original game.
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*• no coordination and autonomous fiscal policies. The fiscal authorities in the differ­
ent countries are free to fit their policies to their country’s specific needs, and no 
interaction (neither informal nor formal) is relevant;
• positive coordination via sharing of information (informal cooperation). A loose form 
of cooperation among fiscal authorities could take the form of periodical informal 
meetings. Such meetings would foster information exchange, without committing 
any of the participants to specific policies. The Euro-12 group seems to b e  a good 
example of such an institution;
• positive coordination through formal mechanisms. In the context o f an increased 
cooperation, for example within a reinforced version of the BEPG (Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines), one could have formal meetings in which the fiscal stance of the 
participating countries would be decided. The decisions taken in these meetings would 
then be binding for all Euro members;
• negative coordination: SGP;
• negative coordination: an ECB-based, alternative SGP. If the ECB has to be free 
from pressure, it must be able to impose its preferences on the national member 
states. The proposal is that the “alternative SGP” should be based on the declared 
preferences o f the Central Bank, and the member states should comply with those 
requirements as they do with the current SGP. Such an arrangement would bring 
the ECB out of its role of Stackelberg follower and allow it to neglect most of the 
stabilization issue.
The current framework oftheEM U  includes the SGP and positive informal cooperation.
3.1 N o coordination
When no coordination is possible and the exchange of information is scarce, one government 
is not able to forecast the policies of the others.
In our model this implies that each government takes the a priori expected value of the 
shocks for the others, that is zero. Also, when the shocks are not known abroad, all the 
participating governments can only assume that the others will be inactive. This leads to 
a very simple behavior; each government reacts as if it was tlie only one hit by a shock.
m i
No coordination
An asymmetric shock with no coordination The outcome of a shock in country i 
when there is no coordination or exchange o f information is
Gi =  irfeSi +  7 hli)
Pi =  Pm.Af (A¿Gy, AiSj, XjlJi) 4  Pg(*i +  £i
(Pff7h “t" PmPftAj i^'PmPg'lh) Pi +  (l +  Pg7h ~~ PmPc^i i^PrnPg'y h)
Ui — (Affjj, A/£,-, A jpj) — u^G/ +  =
=  (UjnflgXak 4- 1 -  UmPhXi -  ug~fh) pi +  (umftgXi% -  ugye 4  umpcA,) £f
G* =  0
f j  =  Pm&f (A/G*, AjSi, Ai.pi) ~
=  (-^iPmttglh + PmPh><i)Vi + {-PmPgXile ~ pmPeXi)-i 
Uj =  uTnAI (A/G'j, A/£^ , A/7 )^ —
=  -  «TnP/,A/) ?ƒ,- +  (ump5A/7e 4  lim/leAi)
M ° =  M  (AiGf, Aj^i, Ai?^) =
=  ( - P ffAi7h 4  phAi) 7/; 4  (-PpAf7 e -  peA,) £,•
Prices and unemployment outcomes for the union are the weighted average of national 
values with weights A* and Aj  — (1 — A/).
In case o f an asymmetric shock in country i, both prices or unemployment raise after 
intervention of the players14; the solution for both £* >  0, rjj >  0 is, for every A € (0, l ) 15,
14 The prices are totally smoothed if A* =  1, which can be interpreted as the one country case or a totally 
common shock. When A* =  0 the result is (trivially) zero as well.
15Once again At — 1 and Ai =  0 imply that the shocks have no effect on prices and unemployment.
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(P > 0,P{ > 0, Pj <  0; U > 0, Uj > 0; M ° <  0), One should remark that the sign is not 
uniquely determined for U{, This is not surprising: the picture above shows that Uj can Ik? 
either positive or negative depending on the value o f A,-. Our computer simulations show, 
however, that for realistic values of the parameters it takes a value of A,- very close to 1 to 
have negative values16.
3.2 Positive coordination
In its strictest definition, positive coordination implies the implementation o f a fiscal policy 
for the EU as a whole by a collegial “decision-making body” , whose decisions would be 
binding for all. This is the typical mode of operation of the common monetary policy in 
the ECB Council, and it has been suggested as a long-term objective for coordination in 
the framework o f the “closer cooperation” clauses.
As stated before, the likely scenario for the very short term seems to be limited to 
a greater sharing of information in search for decisions based on consensus. 'Phis is the 
weakest form o f positive coordination, and is analyzed first.
3.2.1 Informal cooperation
It has been proposed that cooperation could be informal, in the respect o f the existing 
treaties that impede formal coordination among a subgroup of EU members. This informal 
cooperation could for example increase the si la ring o f information alxmt the situation in the 
different countries, without reaching the point of concertation of policies1'. In this section 
it will be clear that, even though the sharing of information is generally perceived to be a 
positive factor among economists, this need not be the case in a strategic environment.
A  shock w ith inform al coop eration  The new equilibrium following a shock will be 
the Nash equilibrium of the reduced form game, where the BRs of the two governments 
intersect. The complete expression of the Nash equilibrium is reported in appendix. After
1(1 In computer simulations with p m = 2,p g =  u g — u„, = 1 ,«  = 1.25, 0  — 0.75 it takes a value as big as 
Ai ‘ 0.85 to have a negative (/, as consequence of a shock in either ?/; or e,. The biggest country in Europe 
is Germany, whose share in the EU GDP is only slightly above 30%.
’ 'The macroeconomic data are usually collected by independent statistical agencies, and become known 
to the public at a later stage (ex post check). It is therefore assumed that the data are truthfully revealed 
to the partners.
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ias asymmetric shock in country’ «, the outcome is for country i 
(7e£i +  7hVi) +  7g ( 7 U i  +  liV i)
Gr =
P i =
1 ~ 7 ?
Ps ( 7 * +  7g7fh)  -  PmPg [ (Ai7h +  * j7 fh) +  (AiTfc +  *j7h) 7g] _ 
PmhVk +  ------------------------------------------Y ----------------------------------------L I Vi +
+  I 1 — pmXifte +
Pg (lie +  7s7e) -  Pmftg [(A*7e +  Aj7c) +  (XjJe +  A¿7e) 7ff]
1 — V2>9
Ui =  UmX ip€ +
umfi( (A;7 c +  Xjy{ j  +  (X jye +  >¡7 / )  79] -  «9 ( l e  +  7 9t / )
1 - 7 |
1 — UmXiPh ~b
Umfig [ (A /7 /i +  Aj7 ]Q +  ( a^  +  Aj7 h)  7J  -  ug ( lh  +  7*7*)
1 “ 7%
Vi
and for country j
[ lU t  +  7**)/) +  79 (7e=< +  IhVi)
Gj =
1 ~7|
Pj
( Vs ( y i  +  797e) -  Pm V-g [ (A n e + Aj7r )  + (A/ye + Aj7e )  7fl]
1 ~ i i
Prn^iPe I “* d*
PmXifte +
Pg ( 7  {  +  7g7hj -  Pm fig [ (A /7 h 4- X j j Q  +  ( X i j [  +  Aj7 /t)  7 *]
1 - 7 ?
Vi
Vs =
__ /  u m tlg [(Af7e +  Aj7e )  +  (Aj7c +  Af7e^ 7ffj -  tip ( 7 /  +  7p7i )
1 - 7?
+  umXifte Si
+
'*W*g [(Ai7fe + X j r Q  + ( x n {  +  Aj-7A)  75j -  Ug ( y {  + 7g7*)
1 - 7 ?
UruXiftfr I 7}}
and for the common monetary policy:
M n =  M (XiG i +  Xj Gj ,Xieh XiVi) =
= ( “ ( ( Ai7i  + Xi7h) 7g + A/7h +  Aj7*) Pg +  PhA/  ^Vi
+  ( ~ !  _ 7 2 ( ( A^ e +  Aj7 ^  +  X a e +  A / y / )  f tg  -  p e X ^ j  Si
This result can be compared with the one of no cooperation. In the previous case, 
the initial response to the shock (7es +  yhV) was also the final outcome. Here, the initial
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shock "spreads around" through monetary externalities. First, each government is informed 
about the shocks occurring abroad, and keeps them into account 7^ (e j  +  7 hVjji ^ len* ^ ie 
reaction o f the partners is also considered (square brackets). Finally, the whole numerator 
is multiplied by 1 /  ( l  — 7 )^ because of the interaction of players.
The ECB intervention can also be compared with the one of the precedent case (no 
exchange of information). For example, in case of an asymmetric unemployment shock in 
/ the difference in intervention is
M n -  M° =  ( ( aa {  +  Aj7h)  yg +  A ^ ^  + A ^ )  1u
which can be shown to be positive for A/ € (0,1) by substituting in the definitions. A 
similar conclusion applies to an inflation shock in i. When the different governments are 
aware of each other’s moves but they cannot coordinate, the ECU is forced to show more 
activism.
The signs of the variables in equilibrium are not uniqtie as in the first case, and depend 
on Ay. Substitution in the definition leads to the following signs: for Ay € (0,1) we have 
(Py > 0, Pj < 0; Uj > 0; M N < Af° <  0). If the country is the smaller one. Ay € (0 ,1 /2 ), 
then (P  >  0; U >  0, (/*■ > 0), for bigger values of Ay it is true that (P  < 0 ;  U <  0). As in 
the previous case, Uj remains indeterminate although generally positive.
A  graphic comparison The example of an asymmetric shock in country i is shown in 
the figure below. The difference in overall fiscal expansion can be stxui on a graph (G'y, Gj) 
by tracing a diagonal line that reports the total expansion on the Gy axis: the distance 
between the quantities (O) ami the point (N )is the increase in expenditure above the non 
cooperation case, which would be realized if the interaction terms (7 9,7c and 7 ^) were zero. 
The interaction between the two Gs is due to the fact that country j  observes the shock 
in /• and anticipates the ECB restriction to the fiscal expansion in therefore j  expands in 
order to offset it. This in turn is anticipated by i, and the fiscal expansion is amplified, and 
so on. The result is an increase in expenditure both in the case of an exogenous increase 
in prices or unemployment.
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Exchange o f inform ation
3.2.2 Formal coordination
In the context o f formal fiscal coordination, the fiscal authorities “act as if they were one” , 
observe the average shocks to the whole union and compute the optimal policy response as 
if they were a single government18. Total coordination leads exactly to the same outcome 
as the one country case, where the shocks are completely smoothed at the union level. As 
usual, the complete characterization of the solution is in the appendix. The outcome of an 
asymmetric shock in country* ¿is:
= xi (7ee< +  7hVi)
P = PmXl +  pgG +  A j$i =  0
U = —umM  — ugG +  XiTh =  0
Gi = \iGT
Pi = -pgXjXi (%Si + 7*»?*) 4- XjSi
Vi = UgXjXi (7€Si +  7/4/i) +  XjVi
Gj = XjGT
Pj = ~PgXl  (7e£* +  7hVi) ~  Xis i
Vj ~ U9XÌ (7e-i +  7hVi) ~  XiVi
M t = {~Pgìh +  Ph) XWi +  {~Pg7e ~  Pe) X>
; !
where are the closed-economy equivalents of 7 e and 7/,1?.
18The weights usati to calculate the aggregate shocks are assumed to be the same the ECB uses when it 
has to compute its policy response; this assumption is not unrealistic (the weights could be the national 
GDPs for example) and allows for a clearer exposition, but it is in no way essential,
19The closed economy equivalents can be calculated by setting At to unity. Their analytical expression is
T^*!‘ ■  H M i  ■ ^ i h w M M i im iH i r i n i u h  ■ M i i 'r M n  itM in i '''¿T l i 'lh f  l i l t l t i i ih ^ '^ r i i y i i i r M i i r 'r i y i i l  iiiii
Both in case o f  a symmetric shock or an asymmetric shock in country i, prices or unem­
ployment remain unaltered at the aggregate level. After a price shock (s* > 0) .for every A* €
(0,1), then (P  — 0, Pi > 0, Pj <  0; U =  Uf =  Uj — 0; M T <  0). After an increase in unem­
ployment (r/f > 0 ) , for every A,- € (0,1), then (P  =  Pi — Pj =  0; U =  0, U{ > 0, Uj <  0; M T < 0). 
In both cases, the shock is partially translated to the other country, while the consequences 
on the other variable are zero.
The involvement of the ECB in the stabilization is of the same order o f magnitude of 
informal cooperation. The total smoothing of disturbances is due to the fact that now the 
response o f the ECB is completely internalized, and therefore the joint fiscal authority can 
decide on which point of the ECB Best Response it wants to be positioned. The following 
picture shows that the only point in which the BR of G and ECB intersect is the origin.
/
Form al coordination
Subgame P erfect Equilibrium  and Nash Equilibrium  One obvious objection would 
be that the backward induction story is not really credible in this case, because a reinforced 
Eurogroup would evolve in something similar to a equal interlocutor to the ECB. As a 
matter o f fact, when the decision about fiscal policy is taken ‘‘as if" there was a single 
authority, the backward induction solution always coincides with the Nash Equilibrium 
(NE) between Gs and ECB. In this simple game it does not make a difference whether the 
ECB moves last (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium) or at the same time (Nash Equilibrium), 
because in both cases the final outcome is total smoothing o f shocks, in the only place 
where the two BR intersect. For the one country case (or the Eurogroup case) the “order 
of the moves" is irrelevant.
' — I ~Pg\ ~ — aua
e^ ~ u»°+p* ’ ~
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3 .3  N egative coordination
Negative coordination denotes commonly agreed rules to prevent fiscal policy from over­
burdening the monetary policy. Currently, the Stability and Growth Pact prevents the 
emergence o f  large public deficits and the resulting threat to price stability. In the follow­
ing section the implemented SGP will be compared with a different one to show that it is 
far from being optimal, both from the point o f view o f stabilization and from the point o f 
view of the ECB.
3.3.1 The “Stability and Growth Pact” (SG P)
The SGP implies that the level o f fiscal expansion is bounded above by a fixed level, say 
by G for the whole union. When the constraint is not binding the solution is one o f 
those described above. Given that the governments arc relatively more concerned about 
unemployment than the ECB, the result of letting them act freely would always be a 
restrictive policy by ECB. The rationale o f the SGP is to limit the potential involvement 
of ECB in short run smoothing by putting a cap on the fiscal expansion that governments 
are allowed to do. In the case of no cooperation20,
Gi =  m in [(7esi +  7 /l77i) ,G ]
Gj =  m in[(7c£f +  7Aty),G ]
M S = —fig (AjG,- +  Aj G j )  — f ie (A¿Si + Aj s j )  -1- fth (Ajrfi +
-  ~  Ve (A*£| +  Aj£j) +  (A,- 1]i 4- AjTjj)
The following picture shows the rationale for the SGP. After a shock in i that leads to O , 
the interaction among governments would produce N  as final outcome. If the SGP limits 
the expansion of each of them, the total fiscal expansion is limited to S„ (the maximum 
permitted by the Pact for country i, the BR to i for country j).
20The case o f  informal cooperation is not analytically exposed because the argument follows exactly the 
same line. The only difference is that the cap on the deficit is more useful because it has the additional 
effect oflim iting the strategic escalation o f  deficits typical o f the NE.
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Interaction with positive coordination An important point to stress is that negative 
coordination (upper bounds to fiscal expansion, like in the SGI1) becomes less effective if 
coupled with formal positive coordination. This means that the SGP could be formally 
maintained but would loose some o f its potential should the member states move to a 
formalized process of fiscal coordination.
The expected value of the restriction of the SGP is a measure of the potential protection 
that the ECB can receive from the constraints of the Pact. In appendix it is proved that this 
value is lower when formal coordination is put into place. The reason is that, in absence of 
formal cooperation, the limit binds every country separately, while in formal coordination 
the pact only controls the overall quantity CT. When the policies are commonly run, all 
the countries run the same (percentage) deficit, no matter what their private shock can 
be, and all hit the constraint at the same time or not at all. In other words, the fiscal 
authorities borrow from each other the unused margins of freedom.
These results are shown analytically in appendix. Here it is important to notice that
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the result is extremely general: the power of a negative constraint like the SGP is always 
and considerably weakened when the fiscal authorities can act together (Sc >  Sn always). 
Positive formal coordination weakens de facto the existing negative coordination.
Perverse effects of the SG P  The SGP could (surprisingly) also lead to a greater ac­
tivism o f the ECB: in the case o f a big unemployment shock, the ECB could have incentives 
to increase the quantity o f money in presence of insufficient fiscal reaction. The figure below 
shows that in presence o f a strong disturbance in unemployment the ECB could decide to 
increase the quantity of money (26 —* 36) because the SGP constrains the national gov­
ernments. The picture also shows that the fixed cap to fiscal expenditure implemented in 
the SGP favors those countries which have been hit by a light disturbance over those who 
really would need to use the fiscal lever even according to the conservative judgement o f  
the ECB. While the more ‘‘lucky” countries hit by a small shock are allowed to provoke 
“unnecessary” inflation (2a), those in real need are forced to wait in (26) for an intervention 
(26 —► 36) o f the ECB. Such intervention cannot be given for granted, because it depends 
on the overall situation in the union; furthermore, it would be costly because the monetary 
stance has more effect on prices than on unemployment. Point (36) has more inflation and 
more unemployment than (36*).
Given the experience o f the national governments before Maastricht became binding, it 
is certain that the fiscal discipline imposed by the SGP contributes to limit the extent o f  
short run interventions o f the ECB. Still, it appears to be an extremely rigid device, first 
because it imposes arbitrary limits, and then because it has the unpleasant consequence o f  
allowing unnecessary expansion by some while impeding the necessary intervention where 
this would be necessary.
3.3.2 Comparing the SGP with a “Flexible SGP”
The SGP can be compared with a similar one based on different criteria. Suppose that 
the ECB communicates its preferences in terms of “maximum inflation allowed for each 
variation in unemployment” (/3). Every member state is then constrained to adopt a fiscal 
policy that, according to the commonly agreed model, keeps the target variables within 
the limits announced by the Central Bank. In other words, the limit (Gi — G) on fiscal 
expansions is replaced by
Gi s.t. [Pi (Gi,£i i r]i ) = p-UiiGi^uTji)]  Vi
The excessive deficit procedure can be applied to non complying states exactly as in 
the current SGP.
The resulting policies follow directly from the setup and do not need calculations. Take 
as an example a shock that increases prices or unemployment. The national governments, 
being more prone to accommodate shocks, always use the whole discretionary margin al­
lowed by the Pact. By doing this, they perfectly substitute the ECB in the short-run 
stabilization function. The ECB then does not need to react to inflationary pressures and 
is able to concentrate on the long run stability of prices.
From the point of view of equity, this criterion has also the advantage of allowing those 
countries that are liit by bigger shocks a larger margin of intervention. On the other hand, 
there is no monetary spillover that can possibly amplify the effects of the original shock 
and the responses of the governments; the propagation of shocks of the Nash Equilibrium 
is stopped at the first stage.
Another SGP?
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3.4 T he interaction o f  positive and negative coordination
In the following section a simulation illustrates how elements o f positive and negative 
coordination interact.
A monetary union of 12 countries is simulated. The countries have weights that corre­
sponds to the GDPs o f the countries that participate in the EMU. As in the theoretical part, 
I focus on the monetary externalities, therefore all the countries have the same structure 
{Pm ~  2, Pg ~  Ug =  Um — 1 ) that respects the required hypothesis of allocation of instru­
ments.
For each country and each period I create a shock to prices and one to employment. A ll 
the shocks are drawn from standardized normal distribution and they are I.I.D. A series o f  
Monte Carlo experiments is then run in order to see which framework imposes to the ECB 
the bigger quantity o f short term stabilizing interventions. The results are summarized in 
the table below where the different levels of positive coordination (rows) interact with more 
or less binding SGP fixed limits. For every combination the mean and variance of the fiscal 
activism o f a country with W'eight 0.17 (like Italy) are reported. In the following row the 
activism of the ECB is described. Finally, where applicable I reported the percentage o f
N o S G P S G P  2 S G P  1
C oord in a tion E xp Var E xp Var E xp V ar
N one
Fiscal .02 .50 -.01 .50 -.08 .47
Monetary 0 0 0 0 .01 0
% cut - 0.1% 0.7%
Nash
Fiscal 0 1.65 -.10 1.38 -.31 .96
Monetary 0 .50 .07 .39 .21 .24
% cut - 3.5% 25%,
Form al
Fiscal -.01 .87 0 .97 -.09 .74
Monetary 0 .31 0 .37 .06 .31
% cut - 3.2% 15.6%,
The main problem is when the ECB feels it has to intervene (to abandon its long run 
policy) to contrast what it perceives to be an excessive inflation o f the Union. A more 
detailed report (on restrictive monetary policy only) is presented in the table below. The 
same table (in graphical form) also appears in the conclusions.
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Size of negative inteventions
No SGP SGP2 SGP1
None 19 21 15
Nash 289 231 96
Formal 251 240 210
The overall size o f the ECB restrictions in 1000 trials
The first observation is that the theoretical case of no-cooperation no-inforraation pro­
duces very small fiscal responses compared to the others. In this case the SGP does not 
have a role, and one can see that setting the ceiling G to 2 and then to 1 changes very little 
the outcome.
The simulation illustrates the theoretical predictions; in absence of SGP, the fiscal 
expansions implies an involvement of the ECB in short-run stabilization that is not only 
one order o f magnitude bigger than the no-cooperation case, but also bigger than the case 
of formal coordination. On the other hand, the SGP effectively constrains the deficit o f the 
member countries in a way that limits the involvement o f the central bank (from 289 to 96 
in the right table).
The SGP becomes almost irrelevant when the countries can act as it they were one; 
the ceiling G limits the involvement of the ECB from 251 to 210 and cannot do better, 
because the fiscal authorities are now able to coordinate in a way that allows them to take 
full advantage of the freedom to spend left by the Pact.
4 Conclusions
In the present paper the question o f which form of fiscal coordination would imply the least 
stabilizing effort by the ECB has been addressed. From the analytical development of the 
game, it appears that two main forces enter into play:
• on the one hand, the awareness of the interplay of fiscal policies and monetary policies 
by the players can start quite complex interactions, that lead to the multiplication of 
the initial disturbances and to their propagation to the whole union through monetary 
externalities. Information without coordination leads to policy induced instability.
• on the other hand, a complete coordination would internalize such effects and avoid 
propagations, while giving back to the fiscal authorities at least one degree o f freedom 
in fiscal policy to counteract common disturbances. The game outlined the risk that 
complete coordination may weaken the SGP.
• in the case of formal coordination, both the SGP and the NE imply pressure on the 
ECB and the complete smoothing of shocks. This result contradicts the common 
wisdom according to which policy coordination comprising both fiscal and monetary 
authorities would imply a lot of pressure on the ECB, while formal fiscal coordination 
alone would not.
Negative coordination is somewhat simpler, and the rules o f the game are decided 
once and for all, therefore it is easier to apply. For these reason it lias probably been 
chosen to ensure limited liability of the ECB in a strategic context which was not (and 
probably still isn’t) completely understood. The simulations underline both the importance 
of negative coordination and the danger that an excessive positive coordination could make 
it ineffective; as on can observe, the SGP is effective in reducing the involvement o f the 
ECB, unless the fiscal decisions are formally coordinated.
The present limits stated in the SGP seem somewhat inflexible; to the extent that the 
SGP is designed to limit the liability of the ECB, it should be also designed according to  
the preferences of the ECB itself. A simple example showed that more flexibility can b e  
granted in such a way to obtain at the same time more stabilization and more independence 
of the Central Bank.
Positive
Negative S6P1
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4.1 Possible extensions
The goal of the paper was to outline a very specific mechanism that may determine an 
unforeseen level of pressure on the ECB, along with a larger use o f fiscal policy, should 
stronger fiscal coordination be implemented in the EMU. Many extensions of the model 
that would make it more realistic are therefore excluded. Some of them would be important 
to add a realistic flavour to the model.
The first natural extension would be to allow for different preferences not only on 
smoothing, but also on the target level of unemployment.
The current formulation of the model considers interactions between countries only via 
the effect o f fiscal policies on the single monetary policy. International externalities of fiscal 
policy (for example via trade linkages) could be also introduced, and their effect would 
smooth the skeptical conclusions about positive coordination. A number of conchisions 
(e.g. the domino effect, the negative implications of exchange of information) would then 
depend on empirical relevance of the two channels. We neglected them here for clarity of 
exposition and because their effect somehow adds up to the one described.
Structural differences in the national markets is probably the most interesting extension. 
Tliis will be the object of a forthcoming paper, in which these differences are introduced 
in the form of a third category of players, worker’s unions.
Many other extensions are possible. However,they are probably better dealt with in 
separate papers.
5 APPENDIX
5.0. 1 First order condition for the ECB
By total differentiation of the FOC derived from (3), the locus of the optimal response of 
the ECB is described by:
<«>
\i= 1 /  Om \i=l /
Given that the ECB is the last player, is simply
5.0. 2 First order condition for government G*
The differentiation of the first order condition
(+Pfl -  A/ {pmpa)) \PmM (G, s, ?/) -1- pgGi +  e#] =
=  —Qt (Aj Vff) ( (G, £,7/) UgGf -|- Ijf)
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for each of the governments leads to:
P i =  - a g - U ,  
p i  *
&9i
From the definitions o f P, U and Aƒ(•)> and using backward induction:
r\ Q
(Pm^  (^>£> d" +  £j) =  +p^ — AiPmf*g
$l£ ^
^ 7  =  ^ 7  ( —«m A f (G > */) -  U g G i  +  7}.) =  X iU m P g
5.0.3 The symmetric Nash equilibrium
(7 eEi +  7 h V i)  +  ( 7 / S j  +  7 ^ ^ )  +  7 g [ ( 7e£ j  +  7h»7i )  +  ( ^ £ i  +  ^ 0 ]  
Gi =  ----------------------------------------------- ;------ k--------------------------
1 - 7 ?
„  (7e£, +  7 h V j) +  (yiei +  y ( v i )  +  7S [(7e£i
O —  ------ -—■— -------------------
1 - 7 ?
M  =  M (AfGi +  AjG j, XiSf -f XjSjt Xii]i +  A^ r/^ ) =
=  ( _  1 _  7 2 ( ( Ai'7, +  Aj7{ )  7 ff +  \ y {  +  Aj7(1)  Iig +  HhXi )
+  ( “ Y ~ |  ( ( Ai7* +  Aj7 a)  79 +  Ai7(l +  \ j y { j  , , g +  ^ A<) ^
+  ( “ T T ^ I  ( ( Ai7e +  Aj7r)  7s +  Aj7 e  +  Ai7' )  tig -  Pc>~i) £i
+  ( “ 1 ^ 2  (('Vl'e +  V / { )  7S +  Ai7e +  A n C j  Vg -  P e ^ i j  £ *
(7)
5,0.4 Formal coordination
^  7e (Ai^i +  AjSj*) -1- 7 h (ai7ji +  Xj7]j)
A/T =  (“ W ft  +  fth) (XiTji + Aj^-) -  (/ic +  pfl7e) (A(£i +  Aj^j)
P  =  PmM +  PpG +  (A,s/ +  Aj-ey) =  0 
U = - U m M  - UgG +  (XiTJi +  Xjrij) =  0
Gi =  A iGT
Pi =  -P gX j [7e (A ;£j +  AjCj) +  7 „  {\ iVi +  X jv j)} +  £, -  (A- ‘  +  X^ ] 
Ui =  Ug\j [7e (Aj£i +  Aj£j )  +  y h (Ajtjj +  A7t;j )] +  Vi ~  (Ai,?i +
Gj = Xj G t
Pj =  - P A  (7,  (Ai£f +  Ajc j) +  7(, (Am, +  Aj,,j)} +  -  (A'- ‘ +  Ajij)
^  =  “ « Ad % ( A iei +  A ^ )  +  7 h (AiVi +  Ai 7,J)]+ > ,i - ( A^  +  A^ )
■p w UtttüMMdÜi
5.1 Calculation of som e signs
These signs are important in that they allow more complex calculations later.
Som e basic identities The first equation is just a different version of the hypothesis 
^  when z =  0 the relation holds with equality, when z is positive the hypothesis is
true with strict inequality. The other identities are the same seen before.
Pm =  (1 +  ■*) Urn ^
{ - f i u m Ug -pgPm )
(— Pm)
fiumPh — +
A j  — 1 — A*
Effect of expenditure on prices Sign (—AiP m H g +  P g) =
\iul0+\ivl+2\iP%z+>‘iZ&ul+\ij%z2-pl-2p4*z-plz2--0ul
S'P> - V g ^ ------- 8------- *---------------------------------------------- *•
The mimerator of the fraction is (fiu2 -f p2 +  2p2z +  zfiu2 -j- p2z2) (A* — 1) always neg­
ative. Therefore the coefficient is always positive.
Effect of expenditure on unemployment Sign (AiU m f ig — =
s,Sn ~ u9-----8— Pl +2P'£ +$ i +JLy --------*•
The numerator is equal to (1—A,) (u2/j +  p2 +  p2z)+p|s+p2.:2 always positive. There-
fore the coefficient is negative
A shock to unemployment less the intervention of the ECB Sign (1 — AiU m f ih ) =
(1 -  A/)3ug +  P g + 2PgZ +  PgZ2 is always positive.
A shock to prices less the intervention o f the ECB Sign (1 — A¡pmfie)  =
-p a-2paÆ-pas2-/iua+AiPa+2Alpai + Ajpasa
s'g n — 7 * J w i A p j A t u j ' 9—
Tlic numerator of the fraction is [vl +  2p£z +  p2z2) (Ai -  1) — [hi2 always negative. 
Therefore the coefficient is always positive.
5.2  Coefficients o f  governm ent reaction functiou when the allocation of 
instruments is indifferent
G i  =  (7 e£i + Ih H i) + ( p f e £j  + ' r i v j )  +  7 gG j
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Sign o f  th e  coefficient o f  7?f : the parameter is always positive
Sign ( ,) ( ÀjPmf-Lg 4" p g )  “  O (AjUm p g  U g ) (1 AjUroP^ )
Knowing that
( - A iptfi +  pga -  aXiujfi +  apuj) =  (1 -  A*) apu^ +  pj (a -  A*/?) >  0 is true, the whole 
parameter is positive.
Sign o f  th e  coefficient o f  ?/ • : the parameter is always negative
(~A jPmPh) {~^iprni lg 4“ Vg) ~~ Cl {XiUmflg — Ug) ( ~A j Umph) =
(p j 4- aul) (Ai -  1) fiugpgïjju7 <  0 always.
Sign o f  th e  coefficient o f  the sign o f the coefficient of ¿¿depends on the size of the 
expected reaction of the ECB to the shock that is on A;. When the size o f the country 
is small enough the sign is negative.
Sign [(1 ^iPmPe) ( AipmPg 4" Pg) û! (AiUmPg ug) ( =
— ~  (pg  4" ««g ) (^i — 1) Aj >  0 always positive
T he coefficien t o f  Gj is less than  one i f  £ >  0. The coefficient of Gj is less than one 
if and only if the expression below is negative:
negative when Ax- is small enough (unless A % is very close to one).
Sign o f  th e  coefficient o f  ejt the parameter is always positive
~ [(^^jPtnPe) ( ^iPmPg 4- pg) — Cl (XjUmpg — Ug) (—AjUmpe)] —
=  -  (pff 4- aul)  (*# -  l )p g 5^ .£¿¿3 > 0 always positive.
Sign o f  th e  coefficient o f  G j: the parameter is always positive
Sign 4- [(pwPg^j) (—^iPmttg +  Pg) 4- a (AïUmpg -  ug) (~umpg\j)] =
\,{pm f^ g ^ j )  ( ^ i P m P g  4- P g )  4“ Ot ( X j U m ftg  UgJ ( Um p g X j j^
The lambdas sum up to one, so the expression can be rewritten as
( -  (AiUmftg -  Ug) {UmPg -  Ug)) a +  ( - A ipmfig 4- Pg) (Pmftg ~  Pg)
or
(p2 + 2sjj2 + .2p2 + ,ju2j2
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When the zeta is zero (the condition on instruments holds only with equality) the whole 
expression is zero and the coefficient is exactly one. No NE exists.
When zeta is positive, then the relevant term for the sign is 
(A,-5u| +  Atpj + Xjzpg - p ] ~  2zp2 -  z2pg -  0ufj =
~z'2vl + ( -2 Pj + Aip£) 2 + (0u2 + pi) (Aj -  1)
this part lias negative sign. Therefore the coefficient is strictly less than one, and the 
NE exists in the case of positive informal cooperation.
5.3 Positive formal coordination weakens the SG P
This appendix shows that negative coordination (upper bounds to fiscal expansion, like in 
the SGP) becomes less effective if coupled with formal positive coordination.
Suppose the union-wide limit to the deficit is G, and call the actual deficits G* and 
Gj.The density function o f (G (,G j) is ƒ (G{}G j).
In absence of formal cooperation (no cooperation or simple exchange of information) 
the limit binds every country separately, therefore the national caps are (A/G, A jG ). The 
restriction imputable to the operation of the SGP is 
(Gi -  XiG) if Gi > XiG 
(Gj -  AjG )  if Gj > AjG
When there is formal coordination, the pact only controls the overall quantity GT. This 
can be seen by observing that in formal coordination Gj =  A*Gr  and Gj =  AjG T always, 
therefore when GT < G it is also verified that Gi <  A*G and Gj < A jG,
The restriction imputable to the operation of the SGP is then 
(G,- +  Gj -  G) if Gi +  Gj < G .
The expected value of the restriction of the SGP is a measure of the potential protection 
that the ECB can receive from the constraints o f the Pact. This value is lower when formal 
coordination is put into place.
To show this, the space (G ^G j) is partitioned in 
C = { ( G , ,G j )-.Gi + GJ < G} ,
A =  {(Gi,GJ) :Gi > \ tG},
B =  {(Gi,GJ) :Gj >XjG}
D = A \C  
E = C \ B  
F = Au B 
G =  C \ A  
H = B \ C
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Then the expected value of the restriction imposed by the Pact is
dGj
ENo (Gi + Gj ~G)  =  f  (Gi -  A¡G) • ƒ QdGidGj
J  djexj f
+ [  (Gj -  XjG) ■ f()dG,
Jfuguh
EFormal(Gt + G j - C )  =  f  (Gi +  Gj -  G) - /QdGidGj
J  euFug
= ƒ [(Gj -  A¡G) + (G j -  AjG)] • ƒQdGidGj
JE U F U G
E f t o  — E poryfun  =  f ( G i  — A;G) ■ f  Q d G i d G j  +  f ( G j  A jG ) * ƒ Q d G i d G j
Jo Jh
-  J  (G j -  AjG )  ■ / QdGidGj -  jf  (Gi -  AfG) • f  QdGidGj
All integrals in the last expression are positive, excepted those defined over E and G  
and the one defined over F  which is zero. Then the sum is always positive.
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Chapter 2
imm •
F is c a l, m o n e ta ry  a n d  w age p o lic ie s  in  a  M U : is  
th e re  a  n e e d  fo r fisc a l ru le s?*
In this paper, I examine the interaction o f monetary, fiscal and wage 
policies and their effects on prices in a Monetary Union (MU). The model 
shows that, relative to the one country case, in a MU fiscal activism 
is always bigger and the capacity o f the Central bank to keep inflation 
close to targets is much smaller. Furthermore, the common monetary 
policy has potentially asymmetric effects, that depend on the size o f the 
different countries in the union and the structure o f the national wage 
setting process.
Fiscal constraints on the national fiscal budgets are effective in re­
establishing monetary dominance in a MU. They also ensure an ex-post 
policy mix of stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policies and moderate 
wage inflation. Some convergence in the structure o f labor markets may, 
however, still be necessary.
1 Introduction
The much discussed fiscal criteria in the Stability and Growth Pact come from 
fears that the EMU may increase Fiscal activism. Two arguments are usually 
set forth in the debate to support this position, namely opportunistic behavior 
by national governments arid the need for coping with structural differences at 
the national level.
Surprisingly, the study of the strategic behaviour of policymakers is normally 
limited to fiscal authorities and federal central bank, with no reference to the 
third important determinant of inflation and unemployment, the behavior of 
national wage setters.
*1 would like to thank Mike Artis for hia supervision and useful comments and discussion; 
Roberto Perotti for discussing with me the very basic ideas underlying the paper; Marco Buti, 
Ilian Mihov, Rick Van der Ploeg and Jürgen von Hagen for very useful insights, Anna Sanz 
de Galdeano for her numerous suggestions. All mistakes are mine. This paper was written 
during a visit to the European Central Bank. The views expressed in this paper are mine and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the host institution.
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Abstract
1
In this paper, I examine the interaction of monetary, fiscal and wage policies 
and their effects on prices in a monetary union hit by economic shocks. The 
theoretical model shows that fiscal activism is related with both entry in the 
monetary union and with structural differences in the national labour markets, 
and analyses in detail the effect of both factors. The inclusion of labour mar­
kets allows me to deal with some questions that are central in the agenda of 
both politicians and economists. The traditional result that entry in a mone­
tary union increases the incentives to use discretionary fiscal policy is reinforced 
by the explicit inclusion of unions. The chapter also suggests that fiscal con­
straints on government deficits appear essential in a monetary union when the 
wage component is taken into due consideration. As for acceding countries, it 
concludes that the process of deficit reduction should be completed before en­
try, as suggested by the Maastricht criteria. Finally, it is shown that different 
structures of national labour markets make monetary policy more difficult in a 
monetary union than in the one-country case.
More specifically, this paper argues that :
• First and most important, fiscal activism is always increased by entry in 
the monetary union. This conclusion does not depend on any switch in 
preferences, and should be considered as an inevitable fact for any country 
joining a monetary union.
• The capacity of the Central bank to keep inflation close to targets without 
continuous interventions is much smaller in a monetary union than in the 
one country case. The most conservative central bank can reduce, but 
not eliminate, this problem. Therefore, a process of previous reduction of 
public deficits and inflationary pressures by new members also favours a 
monetary policy oriented to price stability.
• The former two points imply that a strategy of convergence in public 
finances prior to entry in a monetary union may be preferable botli For the 
acceding country and the stability of the existing monetary union. Entry 
in a monetary union should be a decision that the candidate countries 
take on the basis of economic fundamentals. For Europe, the Maastricht 
deficit criterion requires to achieve lowT levels of public deficit before entry 
in the EMU.
• The effects of the common monetary policy are influenced by the structure 
of the national wage-setting process. As in Calmfors and Driffil (1988), 
decentralized wage bargaining produces higher wage inflation and unem­
ployment in a country. Mechanisms to eliminate the externalities in the 
wage setting process could be beneficial.
• In a monetary union, constraints on the national fiscal budgets are effective 
in re-establishing monetary dominance. They also ensure an ex-post policy 
mix of stability-oriented monetary policy, sustainable fiscal policies and 
moderate wage inflation.
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• From the methodological point of view, the paper takes into account the 
structural break of entering a monetary union and provides an analytical 
and conceptual framework for assessing the potential causes for asymme­
try in a monetary union.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents and describes the 
model in detail. The solution of the game between fiscal, monetary and wage- 
setting authorities is provided in section 3, both with explicit expectatioas and 
with backward induction. Section 4 presents the main results and deals with the 
policy implications of the model. Finally, section 5 summarized the findings.
2 The model
2.1 Description of the model
The illustrative model is a simple linear-quadratic, one-shot game. My choice 
of a game theory model is motivated by the relevance of the Lucas critique in 
the context of the paper. One important implication of the Lucas critique is 
that any structural change in a part of an economc system also changes the 
behaviour of all other agents. In the case of a Monetary Union, the transfer 
of monetary policy at a supra-national level implies that one cannot expect 
the unions and the government to behave in the same way as before, even if 
their preferences remain exactly the same. I consider a Barro-Gordon type of 
model and concentrate on a country belonging to a monetary union. Some basic 
hypotheses of the model are described here.
I assume some structural parameters of labour markets as given, because 
there are no signs of a very rapid change of the national labour market as a 
consequence of the EMU, and even leas of the creation of an EU-wide labour 
market.
The model focuses on stabilization of the cycle, not on systematic biases. 
Therefore, I follow the assumption of Dixit and Lambertini (2003) that the the 
long run targets are agreed among the different players and the tastes differ on 
stabilization only. Even under this optimistic scenario the dynamics are quite 
rich, and several problems arise.
The central bank of a monetary union reacts to union-wide economic indi­
cators, and its actions may propagate shocks from one country to the others. 
Similarly, fiscal policy has spillovers on neighbouring countries. I am neglecting 
both monetary and fiscal externalities in order to to allow a simple treatment 
of the strategic interaction of the players. For a paper taking into account the 
“Domino effect" of fiscal policies caused by monetary externalities, see Onorante 
(2004).
In the model, both workers' unions and fiscal authorities have a larger pref­
erence for output stabilization than the federal central bank1. I believe this
*ln the European Monetary Union this hypothesis is certainly reasonable, as the main 
statutory objective of the Eurosystem is to maintain price stability.
hypothesis is justified in Europe by the statute of the ECB. To ensure a simpler 
model I assume that the governments have totally delegated the objective of 
inflation stabilization to the federal central bank. This parametrization is not 
restrictive, as its relaxation does not alter the qualitative results of the model.
Finally, and purely for explanatory purposes, the article uses a reduced form 
description of the economies and focuses in the examples on the case which is 
most perceived to be problematic, an asymmetric shock to output that cannot 
be dealt with by the common monetary policy.
The common m onetary policy is decided by a federal central bank. The 
central bank is interested in union-wide inflation p and (possibly) output y, both 
expressed as deviations from targets, and seeks to minimize the following loss 
function:
min LCb =  (p2 4- Py2) (1)r
The parameter /3 expresses the relative aversion of the central bank to in­
flation and unemployment. Setting the parameter ¡3 = 0 implies strict inflation 
targeting as described in Svensson (1999), while flexible inflation targeting would 
imply ¡3 > 02.
The central bank chooses a uni on-wide policy variable r, such as a nominal 
interest rate, after observing the deviations from targets of inflation and output 
of the whole union. Variables with a tilde denote union-wide aggregates. A 
union-wide variable is defined as the weighted sum of the corresponding national 
variables with the weights (f> denoting the size of each country in the monetary 
union: x = E ^ x * , : Ei0t =  1}
The national fiscal policy  is decided by the government, seeking to mini­
mize a loss function including national (without tilde) output y and deficit g, 
both expressed in deviations from targets3:
min Lg =  (y2 + 7g2) (2)
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2 According to Svensson, the central bank is a strict inflation targeter when it assigns zero 
weight to ouput stabilization and therefore adjusts its instrument such that the conditional 
inflation forecast equals the inflation target. A flexible inflation targeter assigns a positive 
weight to output stabilization and as a consequence adjusts the conditional inflation forecast 
gradually towards the inflation target. The model presented in this paper allows for the two 
kinds of central bank, but cannot obviously reproduce the relative dynamics due to its static 
setup.
3The inclusion of g  both as a target variable and instrument is a slight abuse of notation. 
A variable which is a goal and an instrument can be better represented as two variables in a 1 
to 1 relationship, in which the instrument perfectly controls the target variable. The use of a 
single letter is to keep the notation simple. The economic intuition for the inclusion o f deficit 
as a goal is analogous to the popular argument of interest rate smoothing for central banks: 
changing drastically the deficit level has a cost. The target deficit can be justified on many 
grounds. For example, it can be though of as a deficit level which ensures sustainability, as 
excessive deficits lead to accumulation of debt and possibly to insolvency.
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conditional to the observed shocks and wage policies, and backward induct­
ing on the central bank. The parameter 7  expresses the relative preference for 
deficit stabilization. The target variable p is not included because the goal of 
price stability has been assigned to the central bank for the whole union4. I will 
explicitely model only one country, with weight 0 in the monetary union.
The national wages are determined as the outcome of a decentralized bar­
gaining process. For tractability, I suppose that in the country there are l/ip 
identical unions, each of them representing a fraction ip of workers. Each union 
j  = 1,2, ..1 /ip minimizes a loss function of the form
min Luj =  (y2 + w (wj -  p)2) (3)
■y
including deviations from target unemployment y and real wage inflation (wj—p) 
of the workers it represents. The collective outcome (symmetric Nash Equi­
librium) of the decentralized wage negotiation is the level of wages iv in the 
country:
W = Vjll’jWj
= wj Vj
(4)
The national macro variables (inflation and output) are linearly related 
to the output shock (77), the price shock (s), the growth rate of wages (w) and 
the policy instruments (g, f). Expectations are set in advance, therefore the 
aggregate supply curve is upward sloping. As a consequence, monetary, fiscal, 
and wage policies affect output and inflation by moving aggregate demand. The 
reduced form equations are:
y — g - r - X w  +  r} (5)
p =  g — r -f \w + e
where f  is the union-wide interest rate chosen by the central bank, g is the fiscal 
policy stance of the national government, w is the national wage level, 77 and e 
are observable shocks to revenue and prices5 and A < 1 is a structural parameter 
describing the effect of wage inflation on price inflation. The appendix show's 
that the equations are compatible with a standard AS-AD model.
The assumption that fiscal and monetary policy are perfect substitutes fol­
low's Nordhaus (1994). This assumption is obviously a simplification and ignores
* Governments are assumed to have no independent price targets. Goverments may still 
have relative price targets, as these affect competitiveness. This aspect is not developed here, 
and could be a useful extention of the model.
5The players in the model cannot observe the shocks, but only their effects on the macro 
variables. This is intentional in the model, and leads in my opinion to more direct policy 
implications, as the nature of shocks (demand, supply) cannot be observed in real time.
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relevant second order effects such as the different effect that fiscal and monetary 
policy have on interest rates, exchange rates, and sectoral prices. However, I 
have shown in Onorante (2004) that a more general setup would not change the 
qualitative conclusions.
The order of the moves has been chosen in a way that most reflects the 
actual setup of EMU. In a game between unions, fiscal and monetary authorities, 
the participants have some understanding of the strategy of the others. As a 
consequence, at each step of the game the players will take as given the preceding 
decisions and form expectations (backward induct) on the following ones. I will 
then discard the simplest case, the Nash Equilibrium, in which each authority 
takes as given the decisions of the others, because I consider it little more than 
a theoretical case. I analyze instead the case of fiscal dominance, when the 
fiscal authorities can form expectations (backward induct) on the reaction of 
the central bank. This case is particularly relevant in the EMU6.
I chose the following order of the moves: a shock 7} or c comes first, the 
workers’ unions determine (each of them playing Nash to the others) the national 
wage level wy then the national fiscal policy g is decided, finally the central bank 
observes the union-wide aggregates and chooses r accordingly.
The choice of letting the central bank move last is quite common in the liter­
ature, and easy to justify. First, monetary policy makers often have a coherent 
and understandable strategy that explicitly depends on macro variables, while 
fiscal policy tends to be more erratic and depend on elections, personalities and 
coalitions, but hardly on moral suasion by the central bank. Also, monetary 
policy is comparatively fast in reacting to external changes in the economy, in­
cluding changes in the fiscal stance of member states, while fiscal policy is the 
result of a long process of negotiation by policymakers and hardly qualifies as a 
variable that the central bank can directly influence in the short run.
The choice of letting the unions play before the fiscal authority comes from 
similar considerations: first, there may be (and normally there are) many unions 
in a country, and their reactions are therefore more difficult to anticipate than 
those of the fiscal policy. Second, wages are normally determined for many 
years and the contracting process is much more dispersed and slower than the 
one leading to fiscal policy.
6This is often referred to in the literature as fiscal dominance. Indeed, one of the objectives 
o f the SGP is to prevent fiscal dominance, safeguarding the credibility of monetary policy both 
in the tong term, by protecting the European Central Bank from potential pressure for debt 
bailouts coming from the national governments, and in the short run by keeping deficits low 
(Artis and Winkler, 1998).
Monetary dominance of a single central bank over many fiscal authorities in a monetary 
union is even less realistic than the Nash Equilibrium.
6
3 Solution of the model
3.1 The role o f expectations
The Central Bank reacts to the effect on union-wide variables. In case of an 
asymmetric shock e or 77 in a country with weight <t> € (0, 1] in the union, the 
aggregate variables react as:
Solving the Central Bank’s minimization problem gives the following expres­
sion for r:
negative output or inflation shock unless the central bank is a pure inflation 
targeter (¡3 =  0) and always increases in response to a fiscal expansion. The 
response to an increase in the wage level is generally ambiguous, but positive 
for reasonable values of the parameters (¡3 < 1), that is unless the central bank 
cares more about output then about prices. Finally, the reaction of the central 
bank is proportional to the size of the country in the monetary union.
The national government targets the national aggregates
The fiscal authority faces a cost in changing the fiscal stance. Hence, the 
multiplicator outside the parentheses is smaller than one, and decreasing in 7 , 
the parameter that indicates the cost of discretionary fiscal policy moves. The 
fiscal policy stance is eased if a negative shock hits the economy, in order to 
compensate for the additional unemployment coming from an excessive wage 
inflation, or to smooth the domestic real effects of an expected monetary tight­
ening.
Finally, wages are set by unions playing Nash with each other. The Nash 
equilibrium describes the solution under no cooperation: each union in the 
country plays as if the other unions had decided their wages already. As a 
consequence, the effects of a wage increase on macroeconomic variables perceived 
by the average union are given by Xy.': the smaller the size y* of the union, the
ÿ = <t> (g -  Au; +  rj) -  r
p =  <{> (g + Xw +  e) — f
(6)
f  = <})(g +  aiXw + Q2 (e +  fir}))
with fti =  , »2 = The interest rate decreases in the event of a
y =  g — f e — Xw + g 
p =  g — re + Xw + e
(S)
and the resulting fiscal policy is
1 + 7 (9)
/
less the effect of a wage increase on prices and unemployment will be taken into 
consideration.
y = (ge -  re) -  Xi>w + 7} (10)
y  — {ge — rc) +  At/m; +  e
the resulting wage inflation is
(u> +  \il> -  uAV>) (ge — re) +  (1 — Ai/’) us +  A
{Ai}> -  \)2 w +  (A4>)2 ( ^
3.2 Results with Backward Induction
This section shows the solution of the model when expectations are formed by 
backward induction, The central bank moves last, after observing the moves of 
all the other players:
r  -  4>{g + 0^10 + 02 (e +  ¡3t} ) )  (12)
For all possible values of 4> (excluding 1) the federal central bank lowers the 
interest rates in response to a negative shock and increases them in response to 
wage inflation and public deficit. The size of the intervention is proportional to
<f>.
The Government observes 77, e and w and backward inducts on the central 
bank. Substituting (12) into the expectations of (9) one obtains the expression 
for fiscal policy:
(4>a 1 +  1) Aw +  {4>ct2p — 1) T) 4- 0Q-2s 
(l-<#2 + 7 (13)
For all possible values of <f> (excluding 1 ) the backward inducting government 
eases the fiscal stance in response to a negative output shock, a positive price 
shock or an increase in nominal wages. In the one country case (<f> =  1) the 
central bank was able to discipline the fiscal authority and to influence the 
expectations of the wage setters; in a monetary union part of this power is lost.
The unions backward induct on both central bank and government, therefore 
(12) and (13) are substituted into (11) in order to obtain the expression for the 
wages:
w  _  _______ tjJ (~ £ g 2  + + <t><*2 0 ) -  1) + ( ^ 9 2  + (f)0t2& -  £g2 -  !) Yw________ y ,
w (1 4- +  <t>oe\Aip — Xtp — £g\ip) (P w — 1) + {<i>£giip + </>cviAt/> + At/» — £<?iV’) Vu- r
________ W (~gff3 — 1 + 4^92 + <f>c*2) {P w  -  1) + (~&3 + 4>Zgi +  <¿**2) y*»________ s
cj (1 +  <t>£g\i> 4- <fxxiAip — A4' — C5 1V') {Pw — 1) +  +  </>aiAip +  At/’ — £<?iV’) Vw
with
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&  = ¿ < < » - 0 - ^ + * ) - ( ( £ - £ ) - * )
= Yw =  (1 -  <f>)2 (ÿi^>) +  A0 (« ! -  1)
and
l  -  ¿ « . - I * * . * . , . ( ( £ - £ ) * » )
and £ =  {1 — 0). The equations above are the complete solution of the model 
with backward induction. In order to get a better intuition of its economic 
implications, the next section highlights some specific issues.
4 Results and policy implications
4.1 Entering the monetary union
Before entering the monetary union, the country can be thought of as belonging 
to a monetary union with itself only. The outcomes are thus described by (14) 
and (13) under the assumption that 0 =  l.When 0 = 1 ,
_  (-A 0  (a i -  1) -  1) UJQ20 +  ( -1  +  a 2 /?) (—Q| AV* -  Arl')
A V  (<*i +  l )2 + (1 +  A0 (ai — l))2 u)
(—A0  (oi — 1) — 1) uj (—1 +  £*2) +  «2 (—«1A0 — At/») ^
A20 2 (oj +  1) +  (14- Ay (01 — 1)) b)
9 = 0
r  =  a i Xw +  0 2  (e 4- Pt)) 
and the macro outcomes are
y =  — (1 +  Oj)A«J +  (1 — 0 2 ,5 )7 7 — 02- (16)
p =  (1 — 0 2 ) Au; +  (1 — 0 2 ) £ ~  <>2^ 9
Comparing the previous equations with (13), one can immediately see that 
the structure of policy interaction differs fundamentally. Before entering the 
monetary union, the national central bank is always able to “discipline" fiscal 
policy according to its own preferences (in this case, g =  O)7. An even stronger
7The one-country stabilization result comes from the fact that the central bank reacts in 
such a way to completely offset the fiscal move, thus imposing the amount of stabilization 
given by its own preferences.
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Variance of fiscal Interventions aller unit shock
Figure 1: variance of fiscal interventions after a unit shock
The results for the one country case (equations 15 and 16) are confirmed by 
the simulation: for every level of centralization of wage bargaining, the central 
bank is able to fully control the fiscal policy, and the variability is then zero. 
When the country enters the monetary union (lighter band at = 0.1) this effect 
of discipline is maintained only if the wage bargaining is centralized (V' =  1 ) so 
that wage setters internalize the effect of higher wages on prices. The more the 
wage is determined by decentralized bargaining, the more fiscal policy intervenes 
actively to offset the unemployment that arises as externality.
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Figure 2: variance of prices after a unit shock
The results on price variability are consistent with the previous findings. 
In the one country case, the variance of prices is extremely limited (Figure 2; 
notice again the <j> = 1 lighter stripe). In a monetary union, prices are driven 
by two different forces: on the one hand, fiscal policy takes advantage of the 
reduced capacity of the central bank to respond, and this increases prices. On 
the other hand, a centralized wage setting is able to limit the inflation of wages 
(and thus prices) accordingly, while this is not true of decentralized bargaining. 
The interaction of these two forces produces the u-shaped stripe at 4> =  0.1. The 
variance is minimal when the two forces offset each other, maximal if wages are 
reduced (one union, v  — 1) or fiscal policy is expanded in order to preserve 
employment after a high wage increase (ip = 0).
A general conclusion could be that the federal central bank of a monetary 
union has more problems in controlling inflation than a national central bank. 
The possibility of free riding by the national governments and the incapacity of 
the federal central bank to target individual national imbalances makes inter­
ventions less efficient and increases the variability of inflation.
4.3 Which type o f federal central bank?
In the model, a country belonging to a monetary union knows that the central 
bank targets only aggregate quantities, and is ready to take advantage of the 
opportunity to free ride when possible. The result that in a monetary union 
the central bank cannot fully control the development of prices should not, 
however, lead to the conclusion that the profile of the central bank is irrelevant. 
The central bank can “present itself to the public" as belonging to one of three
12
types: a “soft” central bank uses an active Taylor rule, including both inflation 
and unemployment in its objective function (0 >  0); a “hard central bank” is a 
pure inflation targeter (0 = 0); the central bank is “passive” if monetary policy 
is taken as given by the other players (0 = 0).8. As a matter of fact, a pure 
inflation targeter can be shown to be preferable to a ’passive central bank’.
Figure 3 compares the “soft” central bank {0 > 0) with the pure inflation 
targeter (0 =  0). The plot is the absolute difference in the variance of prices, 
the colors highlight when the variance is smaller in the case of an active central 
bank (white color) or in the case of pure inflation targeting (dark areas).
Taylor rule vs. pure Inflation targeting
Figure 3: taylor rule vs pure inflation targeting
The picture shows the fundamental role played by the labour market. When 
wage contacting is strongly decentralized (0 close to zero), a central bank com­
mitted to “punish” the inflationary effect of excessive wages always obtains a low 
variance of inflation. This is not always true if the labor market is centralized 
enough.
The role of 0 is also extremely important: in the one country case ( 0 = 1 ,  
far away edge of the graph), there are many values of V for which the central 
bank can target both inflation and unemployment. The case is different in a 
monetary union (0 small , near edge of the graph), because the inefficiencies of 
a decentralized labor market are multiplied by the opport unistic behavior of the 
fiscal authorities. Pure inflation targeting appears then to be the best option
8 Another way to define the passive monetary policy is to say that the CB acts as if the 
country had weight zero in the union. Since the reaction is proportional to the size of the 
country, this amouta to saying that the CB does not react at all.
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to reduce the variability of inflation for almost all labor market structures. 
Incidentally, the gain is biggest in absolute values for those countries whose <f> 
lies between 10 and 20 per cent (like many countries belonging to the EMU).
The final question is whether the central bank should try to persuade the 
national governments to consider its policy as given, or whether it should culti­
vate the image of a strict inflation targeter. Figure 4 provides a clear-cut answer 
to this question by showing the difference in price variance obtained under the 
two regimes. The darker area highlights the points in which the difference is 
close to zero, all the other values are negative.
L ; Inflation targeting vs. Inaction | O
Figure 4: inflation targeting versus inaction
As expected, a very small country (near edge of the graph) is indifferent 
between the two regimes, because the central bank does not react to its domestic 
variables in any case. Another narrow indifference set is located around the value 
of tb in which the effects of fiscal and wages policies exactly offset each other. 
Its exact location depends on the specific parametrization of the simulation. In 
every other case, inflation targeting is strictly superior to inaction in the control 
of inflation variability.
A general conclusion could be that the central bank of a monetary union 
does not have the same choice that a national central bank would face. The 
possibility of free riding by the national governments and the incapacity of the 
central bank to target national imbalances individually impose pure inflation 
targeting as the regime that best allows to keep inflation under control.
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4.4 The effect o f  fiscal constraints
In Europe, the consideration that a monetary union may multiply the effects of 
any deficit bias led to the establishment of the fiscal criteria in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. The budgetary rules aim at tying the governments’ hands and 
insulating the central bank from possible pressures arising from undisciplined 
members of the union. The Pact states that the ratio of the annual govern­
ment deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) must not exceed 3%. When the 
threshold is reached, expanding fiscal policy will not be possible. Without loss 
of generality, and in order to simplify the notation, we set the threshold to zero 
(g =  0) in the model.
Are fiscal constraints really necessary in a monetary union? The answer 
provided by Figure 5 shows the final effect on inflation of a shock when fiscal 
policy is free to act. the relevant case is when <f> is small, that is whe the country 
is part of a monetary union. It can be seen that in case of a centralized labour 
market (ip =  1) the shock has a limited impact on prices. However, when V’ is 
smaller the interaction of policies leads to an increase in the final prices that 
further deteriorates the competitive position of the country affected. At least 
in these cases fiscal constraints would be beneficial.
Effeet on p rie»  of a unitary shock
Figure 5: effect on prices of a unitary shock
A further look at figure 2 confirms that the inflation is more difficult to 
control in a monetary union than in the one country case. The answer seems 
therefore decidedly positive.
Are fiscal criteria really helpful? Consider how fiscal policy affects the dy­
namics of wages (with backward induction on the central bank) and ex post
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monetary policy: from (11) and (7) and imposing g =  0 one obtains for every 
il\ <t> <  1 that
dr
dg
dw
dge
0 > O  (17)
________(0 — 1) (—ui +  a;\ip — A0)_______
(w — u;A0 +  A0) 0ai A +  A2i/>2 +  (A0 — l)2 a;
Equations (17) show the fundamental role played by the constraints to fiscal 
policy in allowing the federal central bank to control inflation. Removing the 
fiscal bias influences both the ex post monetary policy and disciplines the ex ante 
wage dynamics; the effect is even larger if one considers that an unconstrained 
fiscal policy would respond positively to wage inflation. One should notice that 
even though the model has been built on symmetric loss functions for all the 
players, the fiscal constraints become binding only on the inflationary side, and 
they never impede budget consolidation when necessary. The effect of the fiscal 
constraints is implicit coordination characterized by lower deficits, low interest 
rates and inflation under control. Once again there is not an explicit welfare 
analysis in the paper, but there is a strong consensus in the literature (for 
example Nordhaus, 1994) that an equilibrium of sustainable fiscal policies and 
loose monetary policy is to be preferred to a combination of loose fiscal and 
tight monetary policy.
5 Conclusions
The paper develops a model of policy interactions in a monetary union, focus­
ing on wage dynamics, fiscal and monetary activism and their consequences on 
inflation. The simple9 model is capable of grasping and expliciting the strate­
gic interactions of the different policymakers, and to highlight some relevant 
problems that are central in the current policy debate.
The following conclusions emerge:
• First and most important, fiscal activism is always increased by entry in 
the monetary union. This conclusion does not depend on any switch in 
preferences, and should be considered as an inevitable fact for any country 
joining a monetary union.
• The capacity of the Central bank to keep inflation close to targets is much 
smaller in a monetary union than in the one country case. Furthermore, 
the model shows that the unique monetary policy can lead to very different 
price dynamics in different countries of the union. A conservative central 
bank can reduce but not eliminate this problem.
9The model is simple because the agents agree on the long run targets and their preferences 
differ on the degree of stabilization only.
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• The former two points imply that a strategy of convergence in public 
finances prior to entry in a monetary union may be preferable both for the 
acceding country and the stability of the existing monetary union. Entry 
in a monetary union should be a decision that the candidate countries 
take on the basis of economic fundamentals. For Europe, the Maastricht 
deficit criterion requires to achieve low levels of public deficit before entry 
in the EMU.
• The effects of the common monetary policy are influenced by the struc­
ture of the national wage setting process. The model shows that some 
convergence in the structure of labor markets could be useful. Mecha­
nisms to eliminate the externalities in the wage setting process could also 
be beneficial.
• Fiscal constraints are necessary and useful in a monetary union, as they 
are effective in re-establishing monetary dominance. They also ensure an 
ex-post policy mix of stability-oriented monetary policy, sustainable fiscal 
policies and moderate wage inflation.
• From the methodological point of view, the paper takes into account the 
structural break of the EMU and provides an analytical and conceptual 
framework for assessing the potential causes for asymmetry in the mon­
etary union.
The goal of the paper was not to take into account all possible factors, 
but to disentangle a relevant mechanism of interaction among players which is 
typical of a monetary union. The conclusions cannot be considered as absolute 
statements, as they may not be valid in the context of a different modclization. 
There are several directions in which the paper could be developed.
Most importantly, the preferences of the agents are extremely simplified 
and could be enriched by adding sistematic biases for the national governments 
and the unions, in order to obtain results that are valid for the steady state 
and not only for the cyclical fluctuations. Alternatively, an asymmetry in the 
preferences of the governants in responding to a positive or a negative shock 
could be explicitely modeled.
The current formulation of the model considers only7 the interactions be­
tween fiscal and wage policies o f one country and the single monetary policy. 
International externalities of fiscal policy (for example via trade linkages) could 
be also introduced. Other relevant phenomena, such as the exchange rate of the 
common currency, differences in tastes between the countries, may affect the 
results in various ways. However, this would imply modeling explicitely at least 
a second country, therefore they are neglected for clarity of exposition.
These remain interesting topics for future research.
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6 Appendix
Here I show the derivation of from a simple AD-AS framework with rational 
expectations formed before the shocks are observed.
Demand and supply can be represented as:
yd =  -p +  <f>(g -  r) +  ed 
Va ~ (V -  Pe) — Att> +  ea
where all the variables are expressed in difference from targets (m, g, w) or long 
run levels (y, p). The demand and supply shocks are ed and e3, A is a fixed 
parameter, which shows that the wage inflation is reflected on inflation (with 
a coefficient A <  1, since wages are only one of the production factors in the 
economy).
The reduced form is obtained by solving for the equilibrium {yd =  ys), fixing 
the expectations (pe — 0) and rescaling the equations:
y ~  <t>{g~r)-\w + (ed -  ea) (18)
P ~  <l>(g-r) 4- Au>+ (ed +  es)
After renaming the parameters, one obtains the final equations (5).
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T h e  éco n o m ie  im p o r ta n c e  o f  fisc a l ru les*
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Abstract
The present paper provides an assessment o f the effect of the re­
cent revision of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) on the European 
economies. A set o f structural VARs, one for each eurozone country, is es­
timated. The estimated models are then used to assess the possible effect 
of alternative sets o f fiscal rules, with particular attention to the Stability 
and Growth Pact in its old and reformed versions.
The investigation suggests that fiscal policy has had in the past a 
limited smoothing effect on the cycle, and therefore the cost o f the old 
rules in the corrective arm o f the Pact was also limited. As for the reform 
of the Pact, the analysis is overall supportive o f  the new country-specific 
Medium Term Objectives. The modified rules of the Excessive deficit 
procedure are likely to give the governments only a limited extra leeway 
to reduce the variability o f the cycle.
Keywords: European Monetary Union, Stability and growth Pact, 
fiscal-monetary interactions.
JEL codes: E61, E62, E63.
1 Introduction
Only few years since the start of EMU, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
has undergone an extensive process of revision. The present paper provides 
an assessment of the effect of this revision on the European economy. A set 
of structural VARs, one for each eurozone country, is estimated. The VARs 
are identified via long run restrictions that are relatively uncontroversial and 
compatible with most theoretical models of fiscal policy; they also take into 
account the effect of monetary policy in order to avoid misspecification. The 
estimated models are then used to assess the possible effect of alternative sets 
of fiscal rules, with particular attention to the Stability and Growth Pact in its 
old and reformed versions.
'The authors would like to thank Marco Buti, Ilian Mihov, Rick van der Ploeg for their 
comments, and Roberto Perotti, Jürgen von Hagen, Carlo Favero, Olivier Blanchard, Ludger 
Schuknecht, Je an-Pierre Vidal and Paolo Paesani for very useful discussions and insights. All 
mistakes are ours. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the 
European Central Bank.
The investigation highlights a number of facts. First, fiscal policy has had 
in the past a limited smoothing effect on the cycle. Second, the rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact have had overall a limited effect on fiscal discipline. 
The modified rules of the Pact are thus likely to give the governments only a 
limited extra leeway to reduce the variability of the cycle.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some historical and 
economic background on the fiscal policy constraints established by the Maas­
tricht Treaty and the SGP and tries to explain why the latter entered into its 
recent crisis. Section 3 briefly describes the proposed reform of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. Sections 4 and 5 focus on methodological aspects such as the 
description of the model and the related literature. Section 6 assesses whether, 
in the past, discretionary fiscal policy has been effective in smoothing the eco­
nomic cycle, or whether a procyclical component has prevailed, thus increasing 
the amplitude of the cycle. Section 7 estimates the effect that the reform of 
the Pact may have on the variability of the cycle and on the public finances. 
Section 8 concludes.
2 Economic and historical background
The fiscal rules laid down in the Treaty of Maastricht and the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) are the result of a perception that qualification for partici­
pation in the monetary union would rmove the incentive to conduct disciplined 
fiscal policies. The main objective of the SGP is to safeguard the credibility 
of monetary policy both in the long term, by preventing excessive public debt 
build-up, and in the short run by keeping deficits low, thus reducing the risk 
of an unbalanced ex post policy mix (Artis and Winkler, 1998). This in turn 
would make the monetary union viable by ensuring low inflation and economic 
stability and protecting the European Central Bank from potential pressure for 
debt bailouts coming from the national governments.
According to Bini-Smaghi, Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia (1994), the binding 
thresholds on deficit and debt were adopted on the ground that market discipline 
alone would not have a sufficient disciplinary effect on the public finances of the 
countries in the euro area. The approach adopted in the Maastrich criteria 
and reiterated in the Stability and Growth Pact associated binding nominal 
thresholds with a procedure for assessing excessive deficits which provided for 
margins of discretion, thus mediating between the two extreme view's advocat ing 
on the one side strict binding rules and on the other simple reliance on market 
imposed discipline.
The threshold values were chosen somewhat arbitrarily. The debt ceiling of 
60% was simply more or less the Community average, and was not intended as a 
limit of acceptability for the debt, but simply as a threshold after w hich changes 
in debt become relevant and a close look at the deficit is necessary. The deficit 
ceiling of 3% of GDP, although broadly compatible with the 60% deficit ratio 
and a nominal growth of 5%, wras criticized as being potentially too strict and 
inflexible. How'ever, the excessive deficit procedure was supposed to provide the
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necessary margins for discretion. All the alternative proposals were rejected on 
practical grounds; the so-called “golden rule“ required a strict and harmonized 
differentiation between current and capital expenditure which was not available 
at the time; a proposal for assessing the budgetary position over a number of 
years was rejected on the ground that it would be heavily based on intentions 
for the future rather than on measurable facts. In the end, the limits were set 
on nominal annual figures.
After only few years since the start of EMU, the SGP has undergone an 
extensive process of revision. This may appear surprising, as the Maastricht 
criteria, very similar to those in the SGP, were never put into discussion. Three 
elements may help to explain this difference.
First, the economic outlook was quite favorable in the second phase of the 
EMU (1998-2001). The improvement in balances experienced until 1999 was 
largely due to the favorable economic upswing, and the structural surpluses 
turned out to be insufficient to allow' the automatic stabilizers to work fully 
through the recession which started in 2001. As a result, some countries adopted 
a restrictive pro-cyclical fiscal stance in order to respect the 3% threshold despite 
the economic slowdowrn, possibly increasing its amplitude.
Second, the structure of incentives has changed. While the possibility of 
being excluded from participation in the EMU proved to be a powerful incentive 
to support fiscal restraint, the stick of the sanctions provided by the excessive 
deficit procedure of the SGP is relatively weak and uncertain. Calculations 
by Von Hagen (2002) suggest that after entry to the Union most countries, 
and especially the big ones, abandoned the process of fiscal consolidation. As 
a result, many EMU participants have expanded their budgets in good times, 
thus hitting the 3% deficit during the recent economic stagnation.
Finally, the experience of the first years of EMU has highlighted that the SGP 
rules have not been correctly implemented in the conduct of fiscal policies. The 
correct or incomplete implementation can be attributed to several factors, some 
of w'hich are summarized by Buti and Giudice (2002). First, the requirement of 
budgets close to balance or in surplus in the medium run is confronted with a lack 
of consensus of how an output gap, and therefore a structural balance, should 
be measured. As a result, the only binding (nominal) rule in the SGP makes 
it intrinsically asymmetric in that it sanctions excessive deficits but docs not 
provide incentives for fiscal consolidation in good times. Second, in the presence 
of current expenses that are difficult to cut, the balanced budget requirement 
may result in an insufficient level of investment. More generally, Buiter and 
Grafe (2001) remark that the enforcement of uniform nominal deficit and debt 
rules may cause problems for EU members whose initial conditions or medium 
terra growth and inflation rates are different from the EU average. This problem 
is particularly relevant for the new member states, whose catch-up process may 
imply a need for higher public investment in infrastructures.
Finally, respect for the 3% deficit threshold of the Treaty does not explicitly 
address nor automatically ensure sustainable public finances1, and may in theory
*For instance, one-off measures can be used by the national governments as substitutes
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still expose the ECB to the “unpleasant monetaristic arithmetic” of Sargent and 
Wallace (1981).
3 The reformed SGP
The European Council of 22-23 March 2005 agreed on a reform of the Stabil­
ity and Growth Pact. The Pact includes two Council regulations: Regulation 
1466/97 on the strengthening of budgetary surveillance and coordination of eco­
nomic policies (the “preventive arm” ) and Regulation 1467/97 on the excessive 
deficit procedure (the “corrective arm” ). Both legal texts have been amended 
in accordance with the report endorsed by the Council. Thus, the reform im­
plies changes to both the preventive and the corrective arms of the Stability and 
Growth Pact.
The main agreed amendments under the preventive arm are:
• The Stability and Growth Pact lays down the obligation for Member States 
to adhere to the medium-term objective (MTO) for their budgetary posi­
tions of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ (CTBOIS). In the new formulation 
the medium-term budgetary objective should be differentiated for indi­
vidual Member States, to take into account the diversity of economic and 
budgetary positions and developments as well as of fiscal risk to the sus­
tainability of public finances. The medium-term budgetary objectives may 
diverge from CTBOIS for individual Member States2. They must provide 
a safety margin with respect to the 3 % of GDP government deficit ratio 
and ensure rapid progress towards sustainability; taking this into account, 
they shall allow room for budgetary manoeuvre and public investment. 
For euro area and ERM2 Member States, budgetary objectives shall be 
specified within a defined range between -  1 % of GDP and balance or 
surplus, in cyclically adjusted terms3, net of one-off and temporary mea­
sures.
• The adjustment effort towards the medium-term objective consists of an 
annual adjustment in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off and tempo­
rary measures, of 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark. The Commission should 
issue “policy advice” to encourage Member States to stick to their adjust­
ment path.
• When defining the adjustment path towards the MTO major structural 
reforms which have direct long-term cost saving effects, including by rais­
ing potential growth, will be taken into account. A safety margin with
for structural changes in the budget, and issues as ageing population are at the moment not 
considered.
2The adoption of new, looser medium term targets implicitly recognizes the lack of rationale 
o f the close to balance or in surplus requirement which, if respected, would drive the debt 
ratios to zero or even to negative values.
3The production function approach of the European Commission provides a common frame­
work for calculating CABs. For a description of the Commission's production function ap­
proach, see Denis, C., K. McMorrow and W. Rbger (2002)
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respect to the 3% reference value must, however, be maintained at all 
times.
Changes in the corrective arm will include:
• A change in the growth threshold for applying the exceptional circum­
stances, that is for exempting a member state from the 3% deficit ceiling. 
The Treaty stipulates that deficits above 3% of GDP will be regarded as 
excessive unless they are expected to be exceptional and temporary. A 
deficit above 3% of GDP is to be considered exceptional and temporary 
if an unusual event beyond the control of the Member State or a “severe 
economic downturn” has driven the excessive deficit. In the previous Sta­
bility and Growth Pact the “severe economic dowturn” was defined as an 
annual fall of real GDP of at least 2%4. In the new formulation of the 
Pact, a deficit over the reference value may be considered exceptional if it 
results from a negative growth rate or from an accumulated loss of output 
during a protracted period of very low growth relative to potential5.
• In its recommendations the Council shall request that a Member State in 
excessive deficit achieves a minimum annual improvement of at least 0,5% 
of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-oiT 
and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive 
deficit within the deadline set in the recommendation.
• “Other relevant factors” to be taken into account in Commission reports 
under Article 101(3) of the Treaty are to include developments in the 
medium-term economic position, and in the medium-term budgetary po­
sition. Consideration will also be given to any other factors that the Mem­
ber State concerned deems relevant. Special consideration will be given 
to any excess over the reference value that reflects the implementation of 
pension reforms.
• The political commitment to reduce government debt would be reaffirmed. 
The debt surveillance framework would be strengthened by clarifying in 
qualitative terms the concept of “sufficiently diminishing and approac hing 
the reference value at a satisfactory pace” for the debt ratio and agreeing 
on a well-specified framework for its assessment. It is unclear, however, 
whether a commitment in qualitative terms can be considered a reinforce­
ment of the debt criterion6.
4 An annual fall of real GDP of less than 2% but of at least 0.75% could also be considered 
exceptional by the Ecofm council on the initiative of the Member State concerned and in the 
light of further supporting evidence.
5Looking at the real growth figures for the eurozone countries in the period 19S0-2OO4, we 
observe that growth has been below -2% in 1.45/1 of the cases and below -0.757c. in 0.91 % 
of the cases. The newr threshold would have allowed for a more extensive application of the 
exceptional circumstances: in the period 1980-2004, growth has been below 07c in 9.82% of 
cases.
6Initia.1 proposals were inspired by the work of some economists (Calmfors and Corsetti.
• The deadline for the correction of an excessive deficit should in theory 
remain “the year after its identification” . In practice, the initial deadline 
could be set one year later in case of “special circumstances” , based on the 
“other relevant factors” mentioned above. Moreover, the initial deadline 
could be revised at a later stage if unexpected adverse economic events 
with major unfavorable budgetary effects occur.
The reform of the Pact strikes a balance between flexibility and sustainabil­
ity7. The automatic stabilizers could work during the period of consolidation. 
The process of convergence would be smoothed over time; furthermore, a fixed 
speed of convergence is indicated, allowing those countries that are more dis­
tant from a balanced budget a longer time period. The sanctions of the SGP 
remain unaltered, but the changes in the corrective arm are likely to make their 
invocation more difficult in practice.
4 Methodological aspects
4 .1  The empirical literature on fiscal policy
The investigation of the interaction between fiscal policy and macroeconomic 
developments requires, as a first step, identifying the contribution of fiscal policy 
to the economic cycle.
Structural regressions have been widely used to disentangle the components 
of fiscal policy. Van den Noord (2002) groups the structural methods into three 
categories. A first approach runs regressions of fiscal variables on different sets of 
explanatory variables. For instance, Gali and Perotti (2003) estimate fiscal rules 
for the discretionary budget deficit, using data on EMU countries on a sample 
period very similar to the one of this paper. This approach gives reliable results 
only if the set of explanatory variables is sufficiently wide, but may suffer from 
misspecification if the correct lags are not included. A second approach uses 
macroeconometric models, whose equations are calibrated. Macro models have 
the advantage of allowing the identification of different kinds of shocks, but 
suffer from the same problems just described, because the equations need first 
to be estimated in order to calibrate the elasticities in the model. The third 
approach is used by OECD, and consists of a mix of different methodologies. The 
elasticities of the cyclical components of taxes and expenditure are computed 
relative to a measure of the output gap independently estimated.
A different approach tries to overcome the difficulties of correctly specify­
ing a model by using structural vector autoregression models (SVAR), which
2003, and EE AG, 2003) and favoured a solution linking the deficit threshold to the level of 
the debt/GDP ratio. The final solution is a weakening of the original proposals: the deficit 
threshold in the corrective part of the pact remains at 3%, while the Medium Term Objective 
in the preventive arm o f the pact is country-specific and related to the debt ratio and the level 
o f structural growth.
7Beetsma and Debrun (2005) provide an interesting theoretical model in which the trade­
off between enforcement of the new rules and flexibility is taken into account. Their model 
also considers the effect of different degrees of transparency in the national budgets.
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require only minimal identifying assumptions. SVAR models are widely used 
in empirical studies of monetary policy, but their use in the analysis of fiscal 
policy is fairly recent.
The lack of high frequency fiscal data or of long annual data series is partially 
responsible for this lack of interest. However, a number of important contribu­
tions have shown that the approach can give useful results. Blanchard and 
Perotti (1999) use a SVAR with taxes, government spending and GDP, all ex­
pressed in real terms, to investigate the dynamic effects of shocks in government 
spending and taxes in the US. A similar approach, with different specification 
of the model, can be found in Fatas and Mihov (1999). De Arcangelis and 
Lamartina (2001) use different identifying restrictions to explore the existence 
of different fiscal policy regimes. Perotti (2002) studies the effects of fiscal policy 
on GDP, prices and interest rates in 5 OECD countries. Favero (2003) and oth­
ers have shown that fiscal and monetary policy cannot be estimated separately, 
because the interaction effects would bias the estimates.
Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), some authors use long run restric­
tions, which are relatively easy to reconcile with economic theory. This is the 
case of Bayoumi and Eichengreen ( 1992), who apply the long run restriction to 
divide between supply and demand shocks, and more recently of Dalsgaards and 
De Serres (2000), who estimate a SVAR for the 11 EMU countries*. Garcia and 
Verdelhan (2001) use a specification scheme à la Clarida-Gali, including both 
short and long run restrictions. They apply it to synthetic Euro Area data, in­
cluding yearly GDP, inflation, real short term interest rate and budget balance, 
and manage to identify four types of shocks: supply, demand, monetary and 
fiscal. They also estimate cyclically adjusted budget balances and a synthetic 
indicator of policy mix.
A SVAR has some properties that make it particularly suitable for the 
present study. First, it can incorporate a measure of the cycle that is completely 
consistent with the model itself, without requiring additional information as in­
put. It also avoids the need to identify specific and possibly restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policy rules. The presence of a sufficient number of lags can also in­
clude forward-looking behavior o f policymakers, to the extent that VAR models 
can be interpreted as reduced forms of forward-looking models (see e.g. Favero 
2003).
A specific advantage of SVAR models is that at least some identifying restric­
tions can be specified in the form of behavioral rules. This is for instance the 
case of the Blanchard and Quah long run restrictions that separate temporary 
from permanent shocks on the basis of their very own definitions. Behavioral 
restrictions can normally be reconciled with a large variety of economic models, 
and are therefore easier to accept. Our restrictions are of this nature.
Building on the SVAR approach, we estimate a simultaneous equation model, 
identifying fiscal shocks on the basis of long-run restrictions.9
8Their restrictions are that only supply shocks have a permanent effect on output, and 
that nominal shocks have a permanent impact on prices only.
9For a careful description of the properties of simultaneous equation models see Ltltkepohl 
(1993), Ch. 10. For a model with variables similar to ours see Canova and Pappa (2003).
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5 The model
The structure of the reduced-form model used for estimation is the following 
one:
where C(L) and D(L) are polynomials in the lag operator and the matrices are 
defined as follows:
The model expresses the deficit/GDP ratio dt, the growth rate j t and the infla-
ratio 6/, the interest rate on debt r* (or, in a robustness check, the long run inter-
to be identically and independently distributed with mean zero and variance- 
covariance matrix £  =  E(ee').
Our structural model contains three structural shocks: an aggregate supply 
shock e f , an aggregate demand (non fiscal) shock e f ,  and a fiscal shock s f . In 
order to identify these shocks we can rewrite model (1) in moving average (MA) 
form. Omitting the exogenous component we have
where A(L) — [/ — — ... — Cp] 1 and v4(0) =  I are known.
Structural form residuals St are assumed to have a normalized covariance
Taking into account that SS 1 = ƒ, equation (2) may be rewritten as
p
y  =  £ c ( £ ) y +  £ £ > ( £ ) * +  e ( i )¿=i
r
oil
b
tion rate Xj as a linear function of their own lagged values and of the debt/GDP
est rate) and the oil price index oil(. The reduced form residuals e are assumed
> '=  £  A(L)c (2)
L=0
matrix: E (ss') =  I. They are linked to the reduced form residuals e by the 
linear transformation S':
(3)
OQ OO
Y =  £ A ( L ) S S - , e =  £ B ( L ) s (1)
where
B(L) =  A(L)S VL
OO OO
B(l) =  '£ B {L ) = '£ ,m S ~ A ( \ ) S
L=1
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Three identifying restrictions are required to just-identify the structural in­
novations from the reduced form VAR. Following a solidly established tradition, 
we identify the supply shocks ef as the only shocks to have a permanent long- 
run effect on growth. This is equivalent to restricting to zero the (1,2) and 
(1,3) elements of matrix 5(1). Moreover, the aggregate (temporary) demand 
shock eP is assumed to have no long-run impact on the deficit/GDP ratio. This 
is equivalent to restricting to zero the (2,3) element of matrix i?(l). The fiscal 
shock e f  is left free. After imposing these restrictions, the long-run matrix B(l )  
looks like:
B( 1) =
* 11 0 0
&21 622 0
¿31 &32 633
(5)
After imposing these restrictions, the signs of some of the elements of the 
S matrix need to be normalized,10 We choose a normalization such that the 
structural disturbances correspond to what are normally considered positive 
shocks.
5,1 The variables
Our dataset contains 26 annual observations of six variables for each of the EMU 
countries, with the exception of Luxembourg, over the years 1980 — 2005. The 
beginning of the sample in 1980 is chosen in order to concentrate on monetary 
regimes that stabilize inflation around a target value and to avoid modelling the 
impact of the two oil shocks.
The endogenous variables are: the rate of inflation (GDP-deflator based) 7rt, 
the real GDP growth rate 7 t, the deficit/GDP ratio dt. A negative value of dt 
indicates a deficit, a positive value a surplus. The exogenous variables include 
the interest rate on debt (the implicit interest rate, calculated as general gov­
ernment interest as percent of gross public debt of preceding year) rt, the oil 
price index expressed in national currency oilt, the debt/GDP ratio bt. The use 
of annual data when working with a dataset containing fiscal variables is in line 
with the literature and due to the absence of non-interpolated data at higher 
frequencies. The interest rate on debt is introduced to take into account the 
relationship between financial and monetary developments and the interaction 
between fiscal variables, inflation and real GDP. A robustness check uses long 
term bond yields, leading to similar results. Oil prices are used to capture the 
world economic cycle and exchange rate movements. The lagged value of govern­
ment debt is introduced on the basis of the arguments contained in Favero and 
Monacelli (2003) and OECD (2003), according to which sustainability problems 
associated with indebtedness seem to be an important determinant of whether 
fiscal stance is pro-cyclical.
*®See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) for a discussion of this issue.
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5.2 The EMU effect
A problem arising in this simulation exercise is that the beginning of EMU 
towards the end of sample may lead to a structural break in the conduct of 
economic policies. More specifically, it has been argued that the EMU may 
provoke a structural break in governments* behavior. The adoption of a com­
mon currency eliminates exchange rate risk and the associated interest rate 
premia among the participating countries. Furthermore, additional deficit can 
be financed more easily because the cost of the additional borrowing in terms 
of higher interest rates is partly spread across the entire currency area. Both 
factors may in principle lead to an increase in the deficit bias of fiscal policies. 
Fiscal developments since 1999 seem to suggest that indeed after the beginning 
of EMU fiscal consolidation has stopped and even reversed in some countries. 
This hypothesis is tested by adding a dummy starting in 1999 until the end of 
available data11, and testing for its relevance. The results, reported in Table 
<DUM>, show that this dummy is often not significant; when it is, the sign is 
not always the one expected.
11 The choice of 1999 aB first year coincides with the beginning of the third phase of the 
EMU. From the purely economic point of view, it presents a margin of arbitrariness, as 
argued in. Canova and Pappa (2004), according to whom previous years (1997 and 1998) may 
already belong to the new regime. However, Canova and Pappa also find that the qualitative 
conclusions do not change by omitting these two years. An earlier break date would probably 
be opportune in a monetary policy rule, but we do not model monetary policy as an endogenous 
variable.
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B* as T-stäs
0 94.98 D 99-04 094-98 0 99-04
Belgium Y= -0.06 -001 -OSS -029
S* 0 05 002 115 08*
P - -0.02 001 -017 ■039
Germany V« •0.06 •001 •026 •047
S« 0.10 004 ¡.71 197
P« 0.08 001 1.14 1.96
Greece Y* -0.0B -001 ■0.68 •00*
S« 0.25 002 241 0.6»
P« 002 -001 0.10 ■005
Spain Y« 0.11 002 138 1.60
S - 0.12 009 1.98 307
P» -0.04 000 •030 0.19
France Y» 0.10 001 126 022
S» 0.03 -001 101 ■035
P - 0.04 001 0.64 027
Ireland Y* 0.10 000 1.76 0.10
S* -0.00 -004 -083 A.97
P* -0.08 -003 -on ■034
Rely Y« 0.21 001 3 24 13S
S= -0.01 001 •0.16 0.1S
P - 0.20 002 2.10 122
N«th. Y» 0.05 002 137 0.92
S» 0.13 004 203 130
P« 0.00 •002 •0.13 •03T
Austria V» -0.01 -001 -032 ■0,6»
S» 0.00 002 ■028 1.73
P» 0.03 001 0.76 033
Portugal Y» ■0.02 000 -020 ■0M
S» -0.12 -001 •131 A JO
P» -0.07 -001 •029 ■041
Finland Y - 0.17 005 0.93 108
S* 0.05 004 032 1.16
P - -0.10 ___-J2S2Z- -054 ■028
Tablet: convergence and EMU dummies in the model
The few available data after 1998 do not allow for a test for structural breaks. 
However, we have compared the out-of-sample forecasts of the models estimated 
until 1998 with the observed variables until 2005, The forecasting ability of 
the model estimated until 1998 turns out to be quite good. One can thus 
conclude that the structural break is not statistically relevant and that pre- 
EMU estimated VARs are a good approximation of the economic structure in 
the whole sample. Following this conclusion, the model is re-estimated using 
the whole 1981-2005 sample.
Finally, a structural change certainly induced by the EMU is that the mon­
etary authority, now targeting uni on-wide aggregates, will appear as little or 
not at all reactive to the national policymakers. While this phenomenon does 
not affect much our estimations, since we do not aim at estimating an interest 
rate rule, the out-of-sample simulation will be run using a constant interest rate 
equal to the one observed in the country in 2005. This is a compromise solution 
in the absence of information about the future developments of the interest rate.
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6 The historical effect of European fiscal policy
This section assesses whether, in the past, discretionary fiscal policy has been 
effective in smoothing the economic cycle, or whether a procyclical component 
has prevailed, thus increasing the amplitude of the cycle. With the term “dis­
cretionary fiscal policy” we mean here those changes in fiscal variables that do 
not respond automatically to changes in economic conditions, as opposed to 
the so-called “automatic stabilizers” . Indeed, several recent works (e.g. Fatas 
and Mihov, 2003) questioned the conventional wisdom that fiscal policy is nec­
essarily counter-cyclical by showing that in many countries discretionary fiscal 
policy has been pro-cyclical. Other authors (e.g. M61itz, 2000) claimed that in 
Europe the conduct of discretionary fiscal policy also reduced the effectiveness 
of the automatic stabilizers. A study of the OECD (2003) finds evidence of 
procyclical easing in upturns and suggests that a high level of automatic stabi­
lization associated with large public sectors may easily lead to more pro-cyclical 
discretionary fiscal policy. Galf and Perotti (2003) conclude that discretionary 
fiscal policy has become more counter-cyclical over time in EMU countries, but 
find the same trend in other industrialized countries.
The evaluation of the past effect of fiscal policies is conducted by compar­
ing the variance of synthetic economic cycles, each constructed under different 
assumptions about fiscal policy. How a cycle can be constructed in the con­
text of the estimated model is quite straightforward: only one of the identified 
shocks has a permanent effect on growth, the two other shocks (demand and 
fiscal) measure the temporary component, that is the cycle. The cycle is de­
rived simply by shutting down the permanent shock in the estimated structural 
model.
Different assumptions on the fiscal shocks produce counterfactual economic 
cycles, whose variance can easily be compared12. By assumptions about fiscal 
policy we simply mean a sequence of fiscal shocks, which can be for example the 
sequence of residuals estimated from the deficit equation (we refer to this case as 
observed fiscal policy) or some other completely different sequence. Therefore 
each simulated fiscal policy corresponds to a different sequence of fiscal shocks, 
while the demand shock and the parameters of the model are left unaltered. It 
has to be noted that every different sequence o f shocks defines a different dis­
cretionary fiscal policy; the systematic component of fiscal policy, the so called 
automatic stabilizers, is always operating, as it is embedded in the structural 
parameters of the model.
The “observed cycle” inTable 2, corresponding to observed fiscal policy, is 
our baseline scenario and is compared with counterfactual cycles derived from 
different fiscal shocks. Its variability (measured by the variance of growth) is 
normalized to 100 in column 1 for comparability purposes.
12The averages of growth and inflation are intentionally omitted from the tables. The 
reason is that fiscal policy cannot sustain growth beyond the short run and has to be repaid 
at some point in time. In our model the effect is zero in the long run, following the identifying 
restrictions, therefore the differences would never be significant.
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Variability of growth: 1980*2004
Cycle
Without
fiscal
shocks
Best
fiscal
policy
Belgium 100
All
69.5
All
72.4
G erm any 100 93.6 85.2
Greece 100 95.0 86.0
Spain 100 95.4 85.7
France 100 89.5 81.0
Ireland 100 100.8 94.3
Italy 100 92.0 83.1
TheNetherlands 100 99.2 91.3
Austria 100 100.3 99.1
Portugal 100 90.3 82.8
Finland 100 70.8 67.8
Numbers below 90 are in bokf
Table 2: effect of fiscal policy on the amplitude of the cycle
The second column shows what happens when the discretionary component 
of fiscal policy is shut down, letting the automatic stabilizers and every system­
atic component operate freely. The cycle in the “without fiscal shocks” column 
is derived by shutting down (putting to zero) both the permanent and the fiscal 
shocks, thus constructing a cycle purely driven by the third (demand) shock: it 
is useful to recall that this simulation does not refer to a world without fiscal 
policy, as the automatic stabilizers are embedded in the impulse responses of 
the deficit and the parameters of the model are never altered in the simulations, 
but simply to one in which rules predominate over discretion13. This simula­
tion has the interesting feature that it eliminates the component of fiscal policy 
which can be misused by politicians. The results suggest that discretionary fis­
cal shocks explain only a moderate part of the variance in the cycle, with the 
possible exceptions of Italy and Belgium, in which discretionary fiscal policy 
appears to have been a major source of economic fluctuations14.
The other c-ounterfactual simulation aims at deriving some measure of the 
potential for fiscal policy to stabilize the economy. Our simulation proceeds 
in two steps: in the first, we simulate the effect of quasi-random sequences of
13The reason for which we do not simply build a fiscally induced cycle and measure its 
variance is that there are interactions between the effects of demand, fiscal and monetary 
shocks, and we want to capture them in the simulation.
14 The variance of the cycle without fiscal shocks is even bigger than 100 for Ireland and 
Austria. This apparently puzzling result (the variance does not always go down after removing 
a shock) is due to the fact that the structural fiscal shock is, in the original VAR, a linear 
combination o f the reduced form shocks. Shutting down one structural shock only, leaving 
the others unaltered, does not guarantee a priori a reduction in the variabilities (although this 
remains very likely).
fiscal shocks, where the definition of quasi-random refers to the fact that the 
sequences of fiscal shocks are bootstrapped from the observed ones in order to 
have the same a priori distribution. The estimated parameters of the model 
are left unchanged. Repeating the simulation a sufficient number of times, each 
with a new draw of the fiscal shocks, we obtain a reasonable representation of all 
possible fiscal policies. Each of them is associated to a simulated business cycle, 
whose variability is computed. In the second step, among the simulations we 
then choose as “best fiscal policies” those that best succeded in minimizing the 
variance of the cycle. However, the implementation of such best fiscal policies 
would require an amount of resources and information which is equivalent to 
perfect foresight and is way beyond the possibilities of any government. We take 
this objection into account and at the same time we increase the robustness of 
the analysis by considering, among the possible fiscal policies, the 5th to the 10th 
percentile of best fiscal policies, and by averaging the corresponding variability 
of the cycle.
The last column of Table 2 shows that fiscal policies could have been better 
used for countercyclical purposes in many countries. However, the only really 
big effects are to be found in Belgium and Finland, where the variability of 
growth is reduced by more than 25%. Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy 
and Portugal present potential reductions above 10%.
The comparison between the “without fiscal shocks” and the “best fiscal 
policy” scenarios is of particular interest, as the resulting output variances go 
in the same direction and are sometimes (again, Belgium and Finland) close to 
each other. In practice it appears that the “best policy” can be to some extent 
approximated by not using discretionary fiscal policy and simply letting the au­
tomatic stabilizers work freely. This latter solution also requires a comparatively 
minimal amount of information.
7 Reforming the Stability Pact
7.1 T h e  simulated scenarios
In this section we try to assess whether some of the reforms of the Pact that 
are currently being implemented are likely to have an effect on the variability 
of the cycle. Since many of the proposals are difficult to quantify, we focus on 
stylized scenarios.
For the Preventive arm of the Pact:
• We calculate for each single country a “safety margin with respect to the 3 
% of GDP government deficit ratio” and a second “safety margin ensuring 
rapid progress towards sustainability” . These two conditions motivate the 
introduction of the new country-specific Medium Term Objectives (MTOs) 
of the new Stability Pact, which would be, in cyclically adjusted terms 
and net of one-off and temporary measures, between -1% of GDP and “in 
balance or surplus” .
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For the corrective arm of the Pact the effect of a different set of rules is 
simulated:
• In the “SGP scenario” the simulation is conducted in accordance with 
a stylized version of the old rules. In practice, as the operation of the 
corrective arm in the previous formulation of the SGP required that an 
excessive deficit must be corrected in the year following its identification, 
up to two years above 3% are allowed in the simulation before the deficit 
is forced again below the reference value. The imposed correction, when 
it happens, is instantaneous. This rule is not applied in the presence 
of “exceptional circumstances” , defined in the simulation as a negative 
growth of -0.75% of GDP.
• A “no Pact scenario” is the second benchmark. In this case, the simulation 
is simply run on the estimated model without any constraint on fiscal 
variables.
• The three following simulations assess the effect of different changes in 
the Pact, each taken in isolation. The current SGP is modified in sce­
nario 3 to allow for a longer time period (three years) above the reference 
value, scenario 4 modifies the threshold that defines the “exceptional cir­
cumstances” to 0% and scenario 5 allows a country in excessive deficit to 
revert below the 3% threshold progressively and taking into account the 
cycle, that is by imposing a 0.5% structural consolidation per year.
• The interactions between two modifications in the Pact are taken into 
account in simulation 6, which implements the changes in the time al­
lowed to correct the deficit and the new 0% threshold for the exceptional 
circumstances.
7.2 Results: the m edium  term  objective
This section finds numerical values for a “safety margin with respect to the 3 % 
of GDP government deficit ratio” and a “safety margin ensuring rapid progress 
towards sustainability” , and compares them with the MTOs of the reformed 
SGP and with the results of Artis and Buti (2000).
In order to perform statistical analysis, we resort to dynamic stochastic sim­
ulation (DSS). As a statistical methodology, DSS is based on two assumptions. 
First, that the estimated model provides an adequate description of the eco­
nomic phenomenon under consideration over the simulation period. Second, 
that the original distribution of estimated residuals is an adequate empirical 
measure of economic shocks, embracing a sufficiently ample spectrum of pos­
sibilities to form an adequate basis for the bootstrapping exercise15. For any 
period in the simulation, the DSS requires taking the following steps:
15In this context, the DSS assumes that the cyclical bebavour of the economies has not 
changed with the advent of EMU. This hypothesis is unlikely to hold in the long run. Artis 
and Buti point out that “as the cyclical behavior of the euro-area economy adapts to the new 
EMU environment, the medium-term targets will need to be re-addressed"
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L A shock is randomly chosen among the residuals of the estimated model 
(bootstrapping).
2. A new (simulated) data point is obtained by applying this shock to the 
estimated model.
3. This new data point is added to the data
4. For every period over the simulation horizon, points 1 to 3 are repeated. 
At every step, statistics of interest are collected.
Replicating the simulation described in steps 1 — 4 a congruous number 
of times (10000 in our case for each country), each time with a new set of 
shocks randomly chosen from the original distribution, it is possible to construct 
an ample set of alternative paths the economy might follow on the basis of 
the structure of the model and of the original distribution of residuals. These 
replications are the basis for our subsequent analysis.
The “safety margin” is defined as the target for the cyclically adjusted deficit 
which prevents the nominal deficit from breaching the 3% limit under normal 
economic fluctuations. In order to identify the safety margin, two informations 
are necessary: the knowledge of the probability of breaching the 3% reference 
value given an initial deficit value, and a (forcely subjective) assessment of what 
can be considered a sufficiently prudent probability p.
The first of the two elements, the probability of exceeding the 3% threshold 
conditional on different levels o f deficits, can be calculated on the basis of our 
simulations. The probability curves are reported in appendix: the continuous 
curves report the probability of going above 3% one year ahead for every initial 
level of deficit, the dotted curves the same probability two years ahead. As 
expected, a higher initial deficit implies higher probabilities of excessive deficits 
given normal economic fluctuations.
As for the prudent probability p, since the main scope of the safety margin 
is to prevent the occurrence of deficits above 3%, it should be fixed to a fairly 
low level, to make sure that the probability of future excessive deficits is not 
too high. Given the arbitrariness of choosing a “prudent probability” , we pick 
up probabilities which are consistent with the rest of the rules contained in the 
Pact: the safety margin will then be such that the probability of trespassing 
the 3% limit under normal economic fluctuations is grosso modo the same as 
the probability of applying the exceptional circumstances clause, under which a 
deficit higher that three per cent is allowed. Looking at the real growth figures 
for the eurozone countries in the period 1980-2004, we observe that growth 
has been below -2% in 1.45% of the cases, below -0.75% in 6.91% of the cases 
and below 0% in 9.82% of the cases. The first two probabilities correspond to 
“prudent probabilities” o f the old SGP, the third is derived from the new set of 
rules. In the figure in appendix these probabilities are represented as horizontal 
dotted lines.
The one-year-ahead safety margin for a country is then defined as the level of 
the deficit/GDP ratio which keeps the probability of that country's deficit being
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larger than 3% one year ahead below the prudent probability p. Analogously, 
the two-years-ahead safety margin is defined as the level of the deficit/GDP 
ratio associated with a p% probability of being larger than 3% two years ahead. 
In the figure in the appendix, one looks at the intersection of the curves with 
the horizontal probability lines.
The values corresponding to the different safety margins are reported in the 
following Table:
Safety margin with respect to the 3 % threshold
Probability: 1.45% 
ftv ra h iib ! 2vr ahead
Probability 6.91% 
ahead f2vr ahead
Probability 9.82%
Iv r ahead ^2vr ahead
Belgium lu -0.4%; -0.4% -1.2%: -1.2% -1 .4%î -1.5%
Germany life -1.6K| -1.1% -2.1%: -1.7% -2.2%: -1.9%
Greece §U: 1.4%f 3.1% 0.1%! 0.9% i -0.3%: 0.4%
Spain I : -0.9%! -0.2% -1.7*1 -1.1% -1.9%* -1.3%
France
I-;!;;:
| t -1M -0.3% -1.8%! -1.4% -2.0%; -1.6%
Ireland -OJM63 -0.5% -1.3%1 -1.1% : -1.4%! -1.3%
Italy |  : ■ -0.9%! -0.2% -1.6*1 -1.1% -1.8% -1.4%
TheNetherlands -0.2% 1.0% -1 .2%: -0.7% r -1.4%1 -1.0%
Austria Fv  ■ ■ -0.9%' 0.0% -i.4% ; -0.9% -1.6%! -1.2%
Portugal 0.7%! 1.0% -0.6% -0.5% -1.0%; -0.8%
Finland 1 1.6% 4.0% : 0.1%? 2.1% -0.2% 1.3%
Safety margin with respect to the 3 % threshold. Negative numbers are
deficits.
The resulting safety margins one year ahead calculated for the 0% threshold 
of the ‘new Pact’ (that is for a prudent probability of 9.82%) are as high as 
2.2% deficit for Germany, where the shocks are relatively small, and as small as 
0.3% for Greece, a country whose estimated model tends to produce systematic 
high deficits, and 0.2% for Finland, whose bootstrapped shocks include the fall 
of Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990s. The average safety margin is 
around 1.4%. Looking at the safety margins two years ahead, they are slightly 
more restrictive, as one might expect, with an average of around 0.9% and a 
maximum at 1.9% (again Germany). This results are very similar to those 
obtained by Dalsgaard and DeSerres (1999) with a similar SVAR methodology.
A similar exercise has already been undertaken by Artis and Buti (2000), 
who use output gap and elasticities of the budget balance to the cycle. The 
methodology used in this section is different, in that it does not use any outside 
information on output gap or elasticities. This difference in methodology is 
partially reflected in the results; in their paper, Germany, Greece, France, Italy 
and Austria could aim for a deficit slightly above 1% of GDP, wThile the other 
countries should remain below:.
As a second requirement, the medium term objectives w'ould be defined in 
such a ray that the debt w'ould be “sufficiently diminishing and approaching 
the 60% reference value at satisfactory pace” .
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Debt sustainability is listed among the relevant factors that the Commission 
has to take into account when preparing a report under article 104(3) of the 
treaty. It has been agreed that the debt condition shall be evaluated in quality 
tive terms, but it cannot be ruled out that the reaffirmed commitment to debt 
reduction may actually lead to the definition of a more specific framework of 
assessment. In the present paper the definition of debt ratio sufficiently dimin­
ishing and approaching the 60% reference value at satisfactory pace is quantified 
by the following general form:
= - A ( 6 , - ! - 1 0  (6)
in which the required rate of debt reduction bt — bt- i  declines linearly with the 
deviation from debt target bt- \ — b* at a constant adjustment speed A. Budget 
dynamics in terms of GDP ratios are expressed by
bt =  deft + _____ bt-1_____(1 + t/f) (1 H- 7Tt) (7)
where deft is deficit (including interest payments), yt is real GDP growth and 
7T( is inflation. Putting together the required consolidation (6) and the equation 
of debt dynamics (7) we obtain the following expression:
—.X— (1 - y l r + ir - ) t , - ,  (8)
which shows that for every nominal growth rate (1 +  yt) (1 7rt) the required 
deficit level deft is a positive function of the debt target b* and, for realistic 
values of the parameters16, a negative function of the previous level of debt bt-1 . 
Taking long run values for n and y, equation (8) identifies for each debt level a 
safety margin ensuring rapid progress towards sustainability.
In order to implement the simulation, numerical values are needed for the 
parameters. In equation (6) we choose A =  0.05 and experiment with both 
b* =  0.4 and 6* =  0.6. The first value of b* implies that a country with a high 
debt ratio around 100% of GDP will be initially required to reduce this ratio by 
3% yearly, while the required debt reduction will be of 1% for a debt ratio just 
above 60% of GDP; as a consequence, the 60% debt criterion would be satisfied 
in a finite number of years. The second value of b* would drive the debt ratio 
to 60% only asymptotically. The long run value for inflation in equation (7) 
is set to 7r =  0.02, a value compatible with the objective of price stability of 
the ECB. Two values of structural growth are tried in order to provide with 
robust evidence, the structural growth provided from the estimated model and 
the average real growth observed in the 2001-2005 period. The results are 
summarized in the following Table.
16For small values of A,y and 7T the condition to hâve a négative coefficient is A >  y + ït.
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Debt in 
2005
Thresholds based 
on Average real 
growth 2001-2005
Thresholds based 
on structural growth 
from model
L a m b d a 0 . 0 9 0 .0 9 0 . 0 9 0 .0 9
B s t a r 6 0 % 4 0 % 6 0 % 4 0 %
Belgium 93% >1.7% -0.7% -2.4% -1.4%
Germany 68% j i -1.6%; -0.6% -1.8%' -0.8%
Greece 108% >4.1% -3.1% -4.0% -3.0%
Spain 43% -3.0% -20% -2.8% -1.8%
France 67% - 2.o%; -1.0% >2.3% -1.3%
Ireland 28% -3.5%: -2.5% -3.8%: -2.8%
Italy 106% -o.6%; 0.4% -1.4% -0.4%
TheNetherlands 53% -1.1% -2.3% -1.3%
Austria 63% -2.UÉÍ -1.1% -2.1% -1.1%
Portugal 64% - 1 .5%; -0.5% -1.6% -0.6%
Finland 41% -2.9%i -1.9% -3.1% -2.1%
Table 4: medium term objectives such that the debt would be “sufficiently 
diminishing and approaching the 60% reference value at satisfactory pace” . 
Negative numbers are deficits.
The resulting medium term objectives vary extensively from country to coun­
try. With the adoption of the more restrictive debt target at 40% of GDP and 
the average 2000-2005 growth, both of which imply a higher consolidation ef­
fort, Belgium, Germany, FVance and Portugal should aim at structural deficits 
between 0 and 1% of GDP. Greece, Spain, Ireland, The Netherlands, Austria 
and Finland wold achieve the necessary debt reduction also in presence of higher 
structural deficits, while Italy should target a surplus of about 0.4% of GDP. 
The less demanding 60% target would allow for structural deficits 1% higher, 
while the adoption of the growth estimated from the models generally implies 
slightly less demanding targets (the exceptions are Spain and Greece).
In order to derive numbers comparable with the medium-term budgetary 
objective of the new SGP, which must both provide a safety margin with respect 
to the 3 % of GDP government deficit ratio and ensure rapid progress towards 
sustainability, the lowest numbers from both exercises must be considered. In 
a somewhat arbitrary choice, the one year ahead safety margins and the second 
column of the previous Table are considered in Table 5. The resulting picture 
is overall supportive of the new MTOs from 1% deficit to close to balance or 
in surplus; Ireland and Spain could be allowed less demanding targets, also 
taking into account that their main reason for the MTO is not linked to the 
sustainability of debt, whilst Italy should target a structural surplus in order to 
reduce the debt ratio.
19
m o n o n
Country Threshold deficit Reason fo r the threshold
Belgium -0.7% Sustainability of debt
Germany -0.6% Sustainability of debt
Greece -0.3% Safety margin from 3%
Spain -1.9% Safety margin from 3%
France -1.0% Sustainability of debt
Ireland -14% Safety margin from 3%
Italy 0.4% Sustainability of debt
TheNetherfands -1.1 % Sustainability of debt
Austria -1.1 % Sustainability of debt
Portugal -0.5% Sustainability of debt
Finland -0.2% Safety marain from 3%
Table 5: estimated Medium Term Objectives
It should however be noted that the data used in the simulation are overall 
deficits, while the MTOs are defined on deficits excluding temporary measures 
and implicit liabilities. The results are therefore to be considered as indicative.
7.3 Results: the corrective arm
The corrective arm of the Pact has been subject to extensive revisions. Such 
revisions or “improvements” in the corrective arm followed the repeated breach­
ing of the old rules by large countries such as France and Germany. They were 
justified on the basis of the need to increase the economic rationale of the Pact 
and diminish the character of “straightjacket” of rules which were leading to 
pro-cyclical policies and increased variability of the economic fluctuations.
This section aims at evaluating the systematic effect of different fiscal rules 
on the amplitude of the economic cycle and on the level of deficits which are 
obtained under normal economic fluctuations. The six scenarios described at 
the beginning of the section are simulated and the resulting variability of growth 
is compared.
In practice, the variabilities are calculated by repeating the Dynamic Sto­
chastic Simulation as explained in the previous section. According to the chosen 
scenario, suitable shocks are fed to the simulation. The working of fiscal rules 
which act ex post is imposed on the simulated data: if a simulated point violates 
the rules imposed by the scenario (e.g. a simulated deficit/GDP ratio higher 
than 3% in scenario 2), a correction is applied. Following the DSS, it is possible 
to determine the distributions and probabilities of the real growth rate and of 
the deficit/GDP ratio, and calculate means and variances.
The results on the variability of growth are summarized in Table 0. The 
variability of output corresponding to the benchmark scenario (the application 
of the pre-reform SGP fiscal constraints) has been normalized to 100 for com­
parability purposes.
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sgp free 3yrs zero proqr all
Belgium ; 100.00 100.43 93.90 95.39 100.85 106.57
Germany f 100.001 87.56 82.86 81.81 87.12 88.59
Greece 100.001 95.92 92.10 97.00 9841 100.63
Spain ? 100.00 : 98.40 96.50 108.63 103.69 97.26
France f 100.00 80.83 98.80 94.10 9880 89.79
Ireland I 100.001 93.80 100.58 97.91 9884 102.90
Italy f 100.001 105.16 101.84 108.69 9985 103.15
TheNetnerlands 100.001 111.83 103.45 110.77 103.84 102.84
Austria i 100.00 :! 107.91 102.68 106.94 101.24 102.41
Portugal !.. 100.00; 111.05 108.06 106.52 116.87 110.89
Finland ; 100.001 99.35 94.17 87.02 88J56 95.08
Table 6: variability of output
The figures provide somewhat surprising results. First, the variability of 
growth increases under the effect of the SGP rules only for a few countries. 
Among those we find some of the countries that have been struggling to respect 
the rules, or that have failed to do so, such as Germany, Greece and France, but 
not Italy and Portugal, which on the contrary seem to have benefitted from the 
higher discipline that the Pact imposed on naturally pro-cyclical fiscal policies. 
Even for these countries, however, the effect is limited. A possible interpretation 
of this result could be that for many countries the Stability and Growth Pact has 
been little more than the official!zation on paper of policies which were already 
in place.
This conclusion is supported by comjwiring the “sgp* column with the fol­
lowing columns in each graph. Column “zero", corresponding to the new' 0% 
growth threshold for applying the exceptional circumstances clause, is at least 
59o lower than the “SGP" column in Germany, France, and Finland, but at least 
5% higher in Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal. A longer time 
span given to correct a situation of excessive deficit seems to moderately re­
duce the variability of the cycle in several countries, namely Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Spain, France, and Finland. This change in the Pact seems as a matter 
of fact to improve economic stabilization by avoiding an immediate correction 
of the deficit below the 3%. On the other hand, the progressive correction of 
excessive deficit, highlighted in column “progr” , does not seem to have relevant 
effects. This may be due to the fact that even in our free models the countries 
are never willing to go from one year to the other to such high deficits that an 
instantaneous correction is much different from a progressive one.
Finally, the interaction of the different modifications has some effect only in 
Germany, France and Finland, which are affected by at least one of the single 
provisions anyway. The hypothesis that the effects of different aspects of the 
reform may reinforce each other does not seem to be confirmed in general; it 
may, however, grant more leeway to the “big sinners” of the recent years..
Overall, the impact of different rules on the variability of growth is quite
21
— ■IW im U lliM .yw ,-
reduced. From this result it follows that the modifications of the Pact are likely 
to give the governments only a limited extra leeway to reduce the variability 
of the cycle. This evidence is consistent with previous findings, e.g. by Galf 
and Perotti (2003) or OECD (2003), according to which the constraints of the 
Maastricht treaty and the SGP do not seem to have created a pro-cyclical bias 
in the conduct of fiscal policies.
The explanation of such a limited impact of different rules is easily found 
in Table 7, which report on the average deficit that the model simulates under 
each set of rules.
Average deficits
sgp free 3yrs zero progr all
Belgium  ^ 10 0 0 0^ 103.60 101.10 102.74 97.97 96.88
Germany ! ; 100.00 99.95 100.00 99.97 100.05 99.93
Greece 100 03 ! 102.36 10140 99.99 102.15 101.64
Spain E 100.00 ; 99.08 99j67 98.61 100.19 97.90
France 1Ü0DCH 99.60 100.17 100.23 99.85 99.83
Ireland I 100,00! 101.30 100.82 99.79 100.34 100.44
Italy i : \ 100.00; 112.35 100.15 99.98 112.39 100.17
TheNetherlands |: ) 11Û0D01 100.46 100.02 100.49 100.10 100.18
Austria 100.00! 100.43 10001 100.40 100.62 99.88
Portugal fv ■-100.00, 107.96 102.60 101.16 107.72 103.42
Finland fc^iOOJOOï 99.91 9987 99.90 99.84 99.74
Table 7: deficit levels
Italy and Portugal (the two countries whose variability of output is reduced 
under the SGP) appear to be the countries whose deficit would naturally be 
higher without the SGP rules. For these countries, the change of the threshold 
that defines the “exceptional circumstances" to 0% does not make a differ­
ence from current rules, one more year to correct the excessive deficit increases 
slightly the average deficit, while a “progressive approach” from excessive deficit 
is definitely the major weakening of the current fiscal rules for all three coun­
tries. For most other countries the current set of rules, if used to the maximum 
extent, would have resulted in a very small change compared to the “old SGP" 
scenario and the “no pact" scenario.
Following these considerations, it can be expected that the implemented 
changes in the rules o f the Pact are likely to have very little impact on fiscal 
policies, as the current rules already guaranteed ample margins of discretion.
The previous analysis was conducted over more than one economic cycle, 
and it therefore took into consideration the variability of growth. However, in 
the current stagnating economic environment many of the proposals for reforms 
of the Pact are aiming at short run increases in the economic growth. An 
evaluation of the different scenarios in relative terms in the short run has been
22
implemented via simulations covering a period of 5 years after the end of the 
sample (2006-2010). The evaluation of the short run effects of the different 
rules is in this case based on mean variables. The analysis confirms the long 
run conclusions: the extra leeway in the conduct of fiscal policies is extremely 
limited, and the effect on growth negligible (less than 0.1% extra growth per 
year for all the countries).
8 Conclusions
The present paper provides an assessment of the effect of the reform of the' 
Stability and Growth Pact on the European economy.
A set of structural VARs, one for each eurozone country, is estimated. The 
estimated models are used for assessing the possible effect of alternative sets of 
fiscal rules, with particular attention to the Stability and Growth Pact in its old 
and reformed version.
The investigation highlights a number of facts.
• Fiscal policy has not been effectively used as a counter cyclical macro- 
economic tool, nor it has had strong pro-cyclical characteristics; simply, 
the discretionary component of fiscal policy seems to have been mainly 
assigned to objectives other than stabilization. The overall evidence sug­
gests that fiscal policy has had a limited (if any) smoothing effect on the 
cycle.
• The restricted impulse response functions confirm that fiscal policy has 
generally a limited and ambiguous effect on output.
• The results of a “best stabilizing fiscal policy” are difficult to obtain even 
for a benevolent government, due to informational constraints. However, 
the “best policy” can be approximated by not using discretionary fiscal 
policy and simply letting the automatic stabilizers work freely. This latter 
solution requires a comparatively minimal amount of information and is 
less prone to abuse by politicians.
The dynamic stochastic simulation is used to assess the effect of the fiscal 
rules of the old and the reformed SGP.
• The analysis is overall supportive of the new country-specific Medium 
Term Objectives from 1% deficit to close to balance or in surplus; possibly 
Ireland and Spain could be given less demanding targets, while Italy should 
target a structural surplus in order to reduce the debt ratio.
• Overall, the cost in terms of stabilization of the old rules in the corrective 
arm of the Pact was limited. A possible interpretation of this result could 
be that for many countries the Stability and Growth Pact has officialized 
on paper policies which were already in place. Furthermore, while the 
variability of the cycle increased under the SGP rules for some countries,
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others seem to have benefitted from the higher discipline that the Pact 
imposed on naturally procyclical fiscal policies.
• The simulations of the modifications of the corrective arm of the Pact sug­
gest that they are likely to give the national governments only a limited 
additional fiscal freedom. The more lenient threshold for applying the 
exceptional circumstances and the progressive rules for correcting exces­
sive deficits are of little quantitative importance, while a longer time span 
given to correct a situation of excessive deficit only moderately affects fis­
cal policy and reduces the variability of the cycle in few countries. The 
findings also suggest that the scenarios with the assumed interpretation of 
the new Pact would raise deficits only in some of the high debt countries. 
This evidence is consistent with previous findings in the literature.
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution. First, the es­
timation of the model assumes that government behavior estimated over the 
1980-2005 period can be conveniently represented by a unique model with some 
dummies. Second, it is assumed that governments do not change behavioural 
preferences in the EMU and that they strictly comply with the assumed inter­
pretation of the fiscal rules under any given scenario. In reality a more lenient 
Pact may bend governments towards a more relaxed attitude on deficits. Third, 
trend growth may in the future be lower than in the past 26 years so that in­
stances with negative or even significantly negative growth may become more 
frequent than expected according to the estimated models.
9 Appendix
9.1 Unit root test of the variables
AP F iiiit root testa on variables
PmbabiUtvofunit not
GDP real ^ovth 
Intercept ? No irtercept
Deficit ratio 
ht«rc«4 v No intercept
GDP deflatcr 
intercept No intercept
Belgium r  O.OQ ' 0.02 0.84 0.20 0.41 0.22
German/ |P  0.10 0.10 .Ä r :: 0,23.1 0.47 0.30 0.08
Greece 0.64 034 ! 0.46 0.84 0.17
Spain y  :>;v o.oo : 0.34 0.75 ; 0.37 0.35 0.02
France H . m o a & l 0.19 ; 0 .131 0.58 0.09 0.00
Ireland Ì  020- 0.30 :  0.58'* 0.04 0.19 0.03
Italy l  " ; 0.03 0.06 , 0 M ‘ 0.40 " 0.01 0.00
TheNetherlands • • i 0.02! 0.19 0.50 0.29 DJ03 0.05
Austria
• •••>'.::
oÖ
0.36 m m - t m i 0.31 0.09
Portugal 0.00* 0.08 024  f 0.20 0.71 0.08
Finland m m o A m 0.06 I- ' 0.15 0.02 0.27 0.03
HO: fJrä not exìstsPmbatxlity of unit not sported. Lag length in the test Schumi? info criterion.
9.2 The identification o f the model
The three long run restrictions on B (l) imply that
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A flJ S S ^ e  =  B ( l) e  =  J 3 (l)S " l e 
A( 1) =  B (1 )S -»
<4(1)S = ¿3(1)
where A(l) is totally known and the zeros of the 5(1) are the long run 
restrictions. The restrictions apply to the transition matrix S.
Finally, the normalization of restricted residuals e implies that
E(ee') =  ƒ
since s = S le or Ss =  e, then
E(ee') = Epee'S') =  SSf = £.
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Conclusion
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Conclusions
This thesis investigates some o f the mechanisms o f  propagation o f asymmetric 
shocks in a monetary union and the effect that they may have on the conduction o f  
policies and ultimately on macroeconomic variables. In the context o f the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), and without any pretension to be exhaustive, the question is 
addressed o f  whether the current framework o f  policy coordination, based on a 
common monetary policy oriented to price stability, national autonomy o f  fiscal 
policies within common budgetary rules and the complete freedom o f  national wage 
policies, is appropriate in ensuring macroeconomic stabilization.
The first two papers tackle the issue o f policy coordination in presence o f  
shocks from the theoretical point o f  view. These papers develop models o f  policy 
interactions in a monetary union, focusing on wage dynamics, fiscal and monetary 
policy and their consequences on the variability o f  inflation and output.
Some general conclusions concern the interaction o f  policies after an
asymmetric shock:
• The effectiveness o f  the common monetary policy is strongly affected in 
a MU by the national fiscal and wage policies. The capacity o f  the 
central bank to keep inflation stable is always smaller in a monetary 
union than in the one country case, and even the most conservative 
central bank can reduce but not eliminate this problem. Furthermore, the 
model shows that the unique monetary policy can lead to very different 
price dynamics in different countries o f  the union.
• As o f  fiscal policy, fiscal activism is always increased by entry in the 
monetary union. This conclusion does not depend on any switch in the 
preferences o f the governments, and should be considered as an 
inevitable fact for any country joining a monetary union. The models 
also highlight the presence o f  a “domino effect”  o f  fiscal policies: once a 
country increases its deficit, the others tend to do the same.
• The effects o f the common monetary policy are also influenced by the 
structure o f  the national wage setting process. The models show that 
some convergence in the structure o f  labor markets could be useful.
■uuimuu
Mechanisms to internalize the costs o f  salary changes on output an 
employment in the wage setting process could also be beneficial.
The papers provide some justification for the existence o f  the European fiscal 
rules as a coordination device. The first kind o f  coordination examined is the so called 
positive coordination o f  fiscal policies, according to which the fiscal policies can be 
agreed together at each point in time.
• Positive fiscal coordination among national governments is shown to 
create policy activism even i f  it is limited to an informal exchange o f  
information. The awareness o f  the interplay o f  fiscal policies and 
monetary policies by the players starts quite complex interactions, leads 
to the multiplication o f  the initial disturbances and propagates them to 
the whole union through monetary externalities, thus leading to policy 
induced instability.
• A deeper positive coordination going as far as taking common decisions 
on fiscal policies would internalize the monetary externalities and avoid 
the international propagations o f  asymmetric shocks, while giving back 
to the fiscal authorities one degree o f  freedom in fiscal policy to 
counteract common disturbances. On the other hand, it would imply a 
high level o f fiscal and monetary activism and greatly reduce the 
independence o f  the central bank: fiscal coordination produces in the 
model exactly the same result as policy coordination comprising both 
fiscal and monetary authorities.
Negative coordination is somewhat simpler: some rules are decided once and 
for all. In Europe, the Maastricht deficit criteria impose low  levels o f public deficit 
before entry in the EMU and sanction excessive deficits thereafter. The models argue 
in favor o f negative coordination, based on rules. In particular, the following 
conclusions emerge:
• For candidate countries, a rule imposing the reduction o f deficits prior to 
entry in a monetary union may be preferable both for the country and the 
stability o f  the existing monetary union.
• Fiscal constraints are also shown to be necessary and useful after the 
establishment of a monetary union, and they are effective in preserving 
the independence o f  the central bank.
• A fixed threshold on nominal deficits limit, such as the common 3% 
deficit limit o f Maastricht, cannot be considered optimal: an alternative 
rule is proposed that allows for more flexibility in such a way to obtain 
at the same time more stabilization and more independence o f  the 
Central Bank. This rule is similar to the country-specific thresholds 
defined in cyclically adjusted term in the revised SGP.
Finally, positive and negative coordination interact. In particular, the 
simulations underline the danger that an excessive positive coordination could make a 
fiscal rule ineffective; as on can observe, the SGP is effective in reducing the 
involvement o f  the ECB, unless the fiscal decisions are formally coordinated.
The final paper is an empirical assessment o f the effect o f  fiscal policy on the 
European economy. The estimated models are also used for assessing the possible 
effect o f alternative sets o f fiscal rules, with particular attention to the Stability and 
Growth Pact in its old and reformed version.
The investigation highlights some general features o f fiscal policy in Europe:
• Fiscal policy has not been effectively used as a counter cyclical 
macroeconomic tool, nor has it had strong pro-cyclical characteristics. 
The overall evidence suggests that fiscal policy has had a limited (if any) 
smoothing effect on the cycle.
• The restricted impulse response functions confirm that fiscal policy has 
generally a limited and ambiguous effect on output.
• A "first best stabilizing fiscal policy" is difficult to implement even for a 
benevolent government, due to informational constraints. However, the 
"best policy" can be approximated by not using discretionary fiscal 
policy and simply letting the automatic stabilizers work freely. This 
latter solution requires a comparatively minimal amount o f information 
and is less prone to abuse by politicians.
Dynamic stochastic simulation is used to assess the effect o f the fiscal rules o f  
the old and the reformed SGP.
• The analysis is overall supportive of the new country-specific Medium 
Term Objectives, whose personalized cycle-adjusted targets correspond 
quite closely to the “ alternative SGP” proposal I formulated in the first 
paper. These targets perform better than fixed nominal thresholds in 
terms o f  stabilization while preserving the independence o f  the central 
bank.
• The cost in terms o f  stabilization o f  the old rules in the corrective arm o f 
the Pact appears to be limited. A possible interpretation o f  this result 
could be that for many countries the Stability and Growth Pact has set on 
paper policies which were already in place. Furthermore, while the 
variability o f the cycle increased under the SGP rules for some 
countries, others seem to have benefited from the higher discipline that 
the Pact imposed on systematically expansive and procyclical fiscal 
policies. A  systematic bias towards high deficits is not accounted for in 
the theoretical models, and the empirical investigation suggests that this 
could be an interesting extension.
• Following the previous considerations, the simulated modifications o f 
the corrective arm o f  the Pact are likely to give the national governments 
only a limited additional fiscal freedom. The more lenient threshold for 
applying the exceptional circumstances and the new rule which allows a 
gradual correction o f  excessive deficits are o f  little quantitative 
importance, while a longer time span given to correct a situation of 
excessive deficit only moderately affects fiscal policy and reduces the 
variability o f  the cycle in few countries. The findings also suggest that 
the new Pact would raise deficits only in some o f the high debt 
countries, those characterized by a stronger deficit bias.
The goal o f  the thesis was not to take into account all possible factors, but to 
describe some relevant mechanisms o f  interaction among players which are typical o f 
a monetary union. The conclusions cannot be considered as absolute statements, as 
they may not be valid in the context o f  a different modelization. There are several 
ways in which the thesis could be developed. First, the analytical framework is 
extremely simplified and could be enriched by adding systematic biases for the
national governments and the unions, in order to obtain results that are valid for the 
steady state and not only for the cyclical fluctuations. Such an extension would also 
bring the model closer to the empirical observation. In addition, the asymmetry in the 
preferences o f  the governments in responding to a positive or a negative shock could 
be explicitly modeled. Other relevant phenomena, such as international spillovers, the 
exchange rate o f the common currency, differences in tastes between the countries, 
may affect the results in various ways. These are interesting topics for future research.
Overall, this thesis provides for some economic rationale for the existence o f 
fiscal rules in a monetary union, and in the choice between different types o f  rules 
argues in favor o f  country specific rules defined in cyclically adjusted terms, such as 
those of the “ reformed” stability and growth pact. The empirical study, however, 
suggests that the importance o f  such rules has been overemphasized in the political 
debate. This evidence is consistent with other empirical studies.
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